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Introduction
The semantics of proper names has been extensively studied by analytic philoso-
phers: in contemporary research, they have been paid more attention to than any
other part of speech. The birth and development of modern modal logic and
possible world semantics changed the way proper names are seen. The modal
perspective highlighted an aspect of proper names that had been overlooked in
the past and that seemed to separate proper names from other types of singular
terms such as definite descriptions. This made many philosophers abandon the
Fregean theory of meaning, which allegedly held names as synonymous with the
defining descriptions of their bearers. This descriptivist theory, which originally
seemed to solve many of the problems created by the directly referential Millian
view, was widely agreed to be refuted, at least in its classical form.
The core of the argument for the new theory of reference, a descendant
of the Millian theory, was the modal behaviour of proper names. Proper names
are rigid designators in the sense that they refer to the same object in every pos-
sible situation. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, are usually contingent
and change their referent from one possible world to another. The metalinguis-
tic argument for rigidity of proper names, originally made well-known by Saul
Kripke, is convincing. It is widely seen as evidence for the failure of the de-
scriptivist theories and an indirect confirmation of the theory of direct reference.
Some philosophers such as David Kaplan1 have even used a similar argument as
a direct proof for the theory of direct reference, thus making direct reference and
rigidity almost synonymous.
However, giving up Frege’s theory obviously meant that the problems
that plaguedMillianismwould return and would need to be answered. The most
well-known issues concern propositional attitudes, empty proper names, and
empty existential statements with proper names. The first problem, although
often attributed to the theory of direct reference in particular, should perhaps be
more adequately called a problem with rigidity in general. In this thesis, I will
be concerned with the question of modalities and propositional attitudes, which
is perhaps the most challenging of the three issues. The challenge is exempli-
fied with what has been called "the Hintikka-Kripke problem", which compares
1See Kaplan 1989.
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alethic and epistemic or doxastic statements of identities between proper names.
The standard logics of belief and knowledge are thought to function much like
standard alethic logic: when talking about someone’s beliefs, to give an example,
we are talking about the doxastic worlds that are accessible to him. Propositional
attitudes of all kinds are notoriously problematic when it comes to the behaviour
of names. There are convincing everyday examples of names that do not function
rigidly in propositional attitude contexts. A theory that says that proper names
are intrinsically rigid does not in itself offer any explanation for these cases of
non-rigidity.
To answer the question about occasional non-rigidity, either the theory
has to be patched to somehow accommodate for deviant cases of propositional
attitudes and the like, or the requirement of intrinsic rigidity has to be dropped.
Perhaps not surprisingly, direct referentialists have often taken the first option
while descriptivists have attempted to devise theories that explain rigidity and
its failures in other ways. The attempts to accommodate for apparent rigidity
failures inside a theory of direct reference have often brought descriptive ele-
ments into the picture, creating theories that attempt to combine the best of both
worlds.2 Few have even attempted to maintain the rigidity of proper names tout
court, explaining the unintuitiveness of this conclusion by resorting to pragmat-
ics.3
This work is divided into three main parts. After an introduction to the
contemporary history of the question of rigidity which serves as a brief literature
review of the most important works in the area, a more specific exposition of
the Hintikka-Kripke problem and mixed modalities follows. This comprises the
first two chapters. The substantive part of this work consists of a negative and a
positive thesis. The negative thesis criticizes the idea that names are intrinsically
rigid and gives grounds for presenting an alternative account of modalities and
propositional attitudes. This account, which comprises the constructive part of
the thesis, is based on a contemporary account of the semantics of modalities,
complemented with a version of Hintikkan theory of individuation.
The objective in this thesis is to keep the issues of direct reference ver-
2Such as role semantics and some theories of mental files. For different types of approaches,
see e.g. Crimmins and Perry 1989, Forbes 1990, Récanati 2012.
3E.g. Salmon 1986, Soames 1987.
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sus descriptivism and rigidity separate, at least for the most part of the work.
The criticism of the Kripkean theory only concerns the idea of rigidity as an in-
built, intrinsic semantic property of proper names. This aspect is not a conse-
quence of the metalinguistic argument, for the rigidity of proper names can be
explained by other mechanisms. It is a further assumption, taken up by Kripke
and Soames among others in order to criticize the wide-scope descriptivism as a
theory of modalities.4 This assumption has never been rigorously defended and
has often been attributed to speaker "intuitions" about proper names in simple
sentences. But while Kripke’s intuitions in the metalinguistic argument seem to
be confirmed by the everyday use of language, there is empirical evidence from
language use that is not consistent with Kripke’s and Soames’ further arguments
about rigidity. There are uses of genuine, nondescriptive proper names that have
sometimes been called "attributive" or "non-referential" that are clearly not rigid
by default.5 If these examples do in fact feature proper names (and not e.g. hid-
den descriptions), then the argument about direct intuitions cannot be correct.
Chapter 3 first outlines and critically examines the arguments for the
"direct intuitions" of rigidity. Furthermore, the evidence against these intuitions
is presented as natural examples of language use. Although the intention is not
to defend any one theory of meaning, many examples in the literature have been
brought up in defense of descriptivism. It is far from clear whether they succeed
in refuting the theory of direct reference, but what they do establish is that rigidity
cannot be a semantic feature of proper names themselves. This result is enough
to justify the search for another explanation of rigidity, regardless of which theory
of meaning is to be preferred.
The suggestion that I will sketch in Chapter 4 is that rigidity is to be
understood as a semantic feature of modal contexts, not of proper names. As
a basic framework, I will use the relational modalities or "switcher semantics"
system developed by Glüer and Pagin in a series of recent articles.6 The formal
idea is to use two modes of evaluation that different types of modal operators
(e.g., alethic, doxastic, epistemic) can switch on or off. Glüer and Pagin’s view
is very neutral, and they do not go deep into explaining what triggers rigidity
4See Kripke 1981 (especially Preface), Soames 1998.
5Martinich 1977, Devitt 1981, Bach 2002a.
6Glüer and Pagin 2006, 2008, 2012.
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in some modal contexts and non-rigidity in other contexts. It is a virtue of the
system that it is not attached to any specific theory of meaning but is compatible
with many ideas. But at the same time, some account of "speaker intentionality",
which according to Glüer and Pagin explains not only the evaluation switch but
also substitutivity and scope issues in propositional attitude contexts, needs to be
given in order to complete the picture.
Therefore, before going into theHintikka-Kripke problem, a few sections
are devoted to an analysis of Hintikka’s own account of modality and his notion
of individuation and "knowing who". To individuate something is to be able to
recognize it as the same thing in various different situations, be the situations
moments of time or counterfactual states of affairs. In other words, identifying
an individual in this way is to give it a place in our cognitive framework. Indi-
viduation is a natural capacity of human beings and is based on the capability
to track continuity in time and space, and to recognize relevant similarities and
differences in physical qualities. There are different methods of individuation
which can be roughly divided into two types: one is object-centred and turns on
the public or shared physical framework, and one is subject-centred and turns on
the particular perspective of an agent, that is, the causal relations between him
and his environment.7
I will then show how Hintikka’s ideas can be adapted to the doxastic
part of Glüer and Pagin’s switcher semantics as a pragmatic complement to the
semantic underdetermination in the interpretation of scope in doxastic sentences.
The other purpose of this account is to link it more closely to some of the simple
sentence examples in Chapter 3. It should be noted that although I want to stay
neutral about the correct theory of meaning, some of the examples, if they in
fact feature proper names, do not seem capable of explanation from the point
of view of direct reference theory. It is up to the direct referentialist, then, to
show why he thinks that they are not genuine names after all. Combined with
an explanation of speaker knowledge and intentionality, the switcher semantics
framework can then be used to solve the Hintikka-Kripke problem along with
some more challenging problems in mixed modal contexts.
The final section of Chapter 4 concerns the issue of linguistic meaning.
Instead of endorsing any one theory, the focus of this discussion is the relation
7Hintikka and Symons 2007.
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of rigidity and direct reference, and the possibility of maintaining a theory of
direct reference in a non-rigid semantics. The theory of direct reference is not only
useful for explaining rigidity in alethic contexts. It has also been proven superior
to descriptivist theories in many other contexts, e.g., in philosophy of science,
since natural kind terms are usually considered to belong to the class of rigid
designators. It gave an answer the Kuhnian challenge of incommensurability
of scientific theories. The reference of a scientific term could stay constant in
different theories because it referred to the same physical object or phenomenon,
regardless of which description is associated with it.8 For this reason, the theory
of direct reference should not be immediately rejected.
Many have thought, however, that non-rigidity and direct reference can-
not coexist. The reason why this pairing seems almost to be considered blas-
phemy might have arisen from equating different types of theories of direct ref-
erence, some of which are not separable from rigidity. I will argue that this code-
pendence of rigidity and direct reference is not universally necessary, given that
one makes a distinction between direct reference of the Millian type and what
could be called direct contribution.9 Only the latter doctrine is conceptually de-
pendent on rigidity. Considering that Kripke himself seems to have been a pro-
ponent of direct referentialism of the first type only, his theory of meaning is not,
after all, incompatible with the semantics suggested here in anything else than its
presupposition of intrinsically rigid proper names. The conclusion is that even
with the added level of Hintikkan theory of individuation, the switcher seman-
tics framework stays neutral with respect to the theory of linguistic meaning.
1 Proper Names and Rigidity
This chapter is a brief introduction to the classical Fregean view of proper names
and the development of modal logic that led to its rejection. The relationship be-
tween rigidity and direct reference in the work of two early developers of the new
theory of reference, RuthMarcus and Saul Kripke, is also examined. Another sec-
tion is devoted to some of the best known defenses of descriptivism, including the
8See e.g. Fine 1975.
9The distinction has originally been made by Crimmins 1992. Martí 2003 makes a similar
distinction using different terms, and it is the latter work that will mainly be examined.
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wide-scope conventionalism and Dummett’s assertoric content/ingredient sense
distinction as further developed by Stanley. These views too have been criticized,
and the attempted refutations of descriptive accounts of rigidity will be discussed
here as well.
The purpose of this exposition is to put themore specificHintikka-Kripke
problem into a broader setting. Essentially, the problem is a challenge for both
Millian and Fregean theories. Where the Millian view succeeds, the Fregean view
faces problems, and vice versa. In addition to the usual descriptive and direct ref-
erence approaches, there have been attempts to combine the two to get the best
of both worlds and solve the problem without their characteristic weaknesses. In
order to better understand the motivations behind these solutions, the different
strengths and challenges of both theories will first be examined.
1.1 Frege’s Problem
Names are not lexical items like common nouns. If asked to say something in
French, replying "Paris" does not count as an answer, just as being able to cor-
rectly use the name "Hesperus" does not add anything to one’s English vocab-
ulary. John Stuart Mill’s theory of meaning respects these initial intuitions by
claiming that reference exhausts the meaning of names.1 This means that there is
no additional (semantic) mediating content between a name and its referent: the
name simply refers.
According to the Millian picture, the sentences "Hesperus is Hesperus"
and "Hesperus is Phosphorus" are both true in virtue of the fact that the terms
"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" refer to the same planet. This seems indeed cor-
rect. But evaluating a simple indicative sentence containing a proper name is
deceptively easy, since such contexts are direct or extensional, i.e., the truth value
depends upon the referent of the term regardless of the way it is described. Prob-
lems arise when one considers indirect or intensional contexts. In modal contexts,
substitutability of co-referring names sometimes seems to fail. Compare the fol-
lowing sentences:
(1) John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus
1See Mill 1906: 19-25.
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(2) John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus
If it is assumed that John is a competent speaker who nevertheless does not know
that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are two names for the same planet, then (1) is
true but (2) is false. An account that gives no other meaning to a name than
its reference does not seem capable of explaining this. It cannot explain why
understanding a statement such as "Hesperus is Hesperus" does not give any real
knowledge, while understanding the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" does.
The problems of cognitive significance of identity statements between
names and their intersubstitutability in intensional contexts were noticed by Frege,
and they are often both called "Frege’s puzzle". Frege pointed out the epistemic
issue that a statement of the form a = a differs from a statement of the form
a = b, even if both true, in cognitive significance.2 Any person who understands
the rules of the language knows that a = a is true. On the contrary, a = b can-
not necessarily be known without empirical investigation. It seems that this fact
plays a part in the problem of substitution in attitude contexts.
Frege developed his theory of sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) as
a response to this problem. Whether Frege’s original notion of Bedeutung can be
correctly translated as "meaning" or "reference" has been a debated issue3, but the
term, in any case, has to do with the named object’s contribution to the truth of a
sentence. The reference of Hesperus, as well as Phosphorus, is the planet Venus
itself. The sense of an expression is related to its cognitive significance or "mode
of presentation; it "illuminates a single aspect of the referent".4 It has often been
attributed to Frege that he thought of a sense as a description, but he was not
himself clear about this, only mentioning the idea in a footnote.5
Themost crucial theses of the classical Fregean theory are that (i) sense is
the cognitive significance of an expression (what is understood when one under-
stands an expression), (ii) sense determines reference, and (iii) every expression
that has a reference has a sense as well. Fregeans also usually accept that there
can be different senses for the same expression, so that the sense can vary in dif-
2Frege 1948: 209.
3See Tugendhat 1970, Dummett 1973: Chapter 5.
4Frege 1948: 210.
5Ibid.
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ferent occasions of use.6 According to Frege, indirect contexts trigger a switch in
the reference of an expression. In such contexts, expressions refer to their cus-
tomary senses which serve as their "indirect referents".7 This blocks one from
fallaciously inferring (2) from (1), since although "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"
have the same reference, they have different senses. Only if John knows that the
two senses belong to the same object can he believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Russell’s theory of ordinary proper names, which largely resembled the
Fregean theory, stated that names are truncated definite descriptions. Russellian
and Fregean theories are often grouped together under the general category of de-
scriptivism, even though not all Fregeans believe that the sense of a name is a gen-
eral description. For the purposes of this thesis, which is concerned with modal
questions, Frege’s and Russell’s theories’ standpoints are very similar. Russell
agreed with Frege in that the meaning of a name is some sort of criterion of iden-
tification, but in his case, the name itself is literally a shorthand for that criterion,
which is a general description. Russell does not deny that there could be Millian
directly referential names, but he notes that those names have to be such that the
reference is guaranteed. Consider the true sentence "Pegasus does not exist". If
the sentence is taken to consist of a logically proper name and a predicate say-
ing of it that it does not exist, of what is non-existence predicated? This problem
led Russell to claim that all ordinary proper names are in fact definite descrip-
tions and thus all statements such as "Pegasus does not exist" or "Pegasus has
wings" are actually existential statements ("there are no things identical with the
winged horse", "there is something such that it is the winged horse and that it has
wings").8
Therefore, according to Russell, if there are logically proper names at all,
then they have to denote something that the speaker can be directly acquainted
with which secures the reference in any situation. Reference to any normal phys-
ical objects would not do:
Now such things as matter (in the sense in which matter occurs in
physics) and the minds of other people are known to us only by de-
noting phrases, i.e., we are not acquainted with them, but we know
6Chalmers 2002: 141.
7Frege 1948: 211-212.
8Russell 1905: 491-493; Russell 1917: 216-217.
9
them as what has such and such properties.9
The only logically proper names in our language, then, had to refer to the real
objects of acquaintance, i.e., sense data. In Russell’s terms, therefore, the simplest
demonstratives like "this" would be the only logically proper names that feature
in the language, and all other names would be reduced to disguised definite de-
scriptions.10
The aspect that unites the Fregean and Russellian theories is that they
claim that names have semantic content that is at least partly descriptive. They
consequentially deny that the meaning of the name can be given solely in terms
of its reference. However, neither Frege nor Russell was particularly concerned
about (alethic) modalities. Exploring these contexts created themost deadly coun-
terarguments to descriptivism, forcing descriptivists to modify their theories in
response to the criticism.
1.2 Modality and Direct Reference
Questions of necessity and contingency have been explored by philosophers ever
since philosophy was born, but there had been no formal framework for them be-
fore the birth of modal logic on the first part of 20th century. In 1932, Lewis and
Langford presented a formal interpretation for propositional modal logic11 which
is often called the first axiomatization of modal logic.12 Fourteen years later, Ruth
Barcan Marcus published the first axiomatization of a quantified modal logic,
which was an extension of the system S2 introduced in Lewis and Langford’s
book.13 The idea of possible worlds as a device of modal reasoning is in itself
much older, but the modern possible world semantics are usually attributed to
Jaakko Hintikka14 and Saul Kripke15, who seem to have come to similar conclu-
sions independently. Marcus, however, already foreshadowed the development
of the linguistic thesis of rigidity of proper names often attributed to Saul Kripke.
9Russell 1905: 492-493.
10Russell 1917: 224. Russell writes that strictly speaking, "I" and "this" would be the only logi-
cally proper names in natural language.
11Lewis and Langford 1932: 178-198.
12Although the earliest relevant source, as Negri 2011 notes, would probably be MacColl 1906.
13Marcus 1946.
14Hintikka 1962.
15Kripke 1963.
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Early modal logicians such as Smullyan, Fitch, and Marcus were pro-
ponents of the so-called new theory of reference or the theory of direct refer-
ence.16 They stated, contra Frege, that names’ only function was to serve as place-
holders for objects. This was a return to the Millian view of names and also to
the problems in philosophy of language that Frege had tried to solve with his
sense-reference distinction. Interestingly, some of the new theorists of reference
seem to have adopted the Russellian view of proper names while disposing of
its epistemic thesis of acquaintance and insisting that all ordinary proper names
are logically proper names. Logicians such as Fitch and Smullyan were less in-
terested in ordinary language, putting aside questions of ordinary language and
especially metaphysics. Marcus also leaned more towards logic than philosophy
of language, although her views on modal logic were based on the Millian con-
ception of proper names, which she called "identifying tags".17
The notion of a rigid designator, although perhaps first used by Kripke,
has been an important part of the debate about the nature of proper names. A
term is a rigid designator if and only if it designates the same thing in every
possible world (let us not yet take a stand on those worlds in which it does not
exist). The relationship between direct reference and rigidity is an interesting one.
The argument from rigidity has often been used as an indirect argument for the
theory of direct reference. For if it were true that all identities between names are
necessary, i.e., names denote what they denote rigidly, then it could not be that
names refer via Fregean senses or are equal to descriptions, because those senses
and descriptions are merely contingent. But it could also be thought that if names
refer directly in the strongest Russellian sense, then they would have to be rigid
designators as well.
There is an easy derivation of necessary identity in standard quantified
modal logic.18 In its simplest form, it proceeds as follows, from the initial as-
sumptions of Leibniz’ law of the indiscernibility of identicals (II) and the rule of
necessary self-identity (SI):19
(1) 8x⇤x = x SI
16See Smullyan 1948, Fitch 1949, Marcus 1960.
17Marcus 1993: 33-34.
18Kripke 1971: 136.
19The conclusion (3) can be derived from (1) and (2) in all classical systems.
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(2) 8x8y(x = y! (⇤x = x ! ⇤x = y)) II
(3) 8x8y(x = y! ⇤x = y) 1,2
Traditionally interpreted, the argument from indiscernibility of identi-
cals concerns the necessary identity of objects.20 It is clear that if two objects are
identical, i.e., they are the same object, then they have to be (or it has to be)
(self-)identical in all possible circumstances, or at least those in which they ex-
ist. As a logical thesis, all principles from which the conclusion was derived are
acceptable in most formal systems.21
If one makes the additional assumption that proper names can be substi-
tuted for variables, i.e., the rule of instantiation (to constants) is accepted, then it
follows that names denote whatever they denote out of necessity. However, this
assumption cannot be taken for granted.22 For in order to freely substitute names
for objects, one has to presuppose that they are directly referential, and thus using
this argument alone to justify the theory of direct reference would be circular.23
The behaviour of ordinary proper names is a matter of language, not logic.
Neither Smullyan nor Fitch was particularly interested in linguistic mat-
ters (although they seem to have thought that not all ordinary names can be
thought of as logically proper names, but rather as descriptions).24 Marcus did
defend her thesis in terms of natural language, but she seems to have held slightly
20See e.g. Fitting and Mendelsohn 1998: 146-147.
21Whether the principle of necessary self-identity can be derived from themore basic formula of
self-identity, x = x, depends on the system used. This requires applying the rule of necessitation
(RN) to x = x to derive ⇤x = x and then 8x⇤x = x, which neither Kripke’s original system
nor Marcus’ early system based on S2 allowed, for the former did not allow application of RN to
open sentences and the latter did not contain RN. Marcus’ proof for necessity of identity is rather
complicated and requires the system to have both Barcan Formula 8x⇤F(x) ! ⇤8xF(x) and its
converse as theorems (see Burgess 2014). With the rule of necessitation and the converse Barcan
formula, one can of course get easily from the more basic thesis 8xx = x to 8x⇤x = x.
22Burgess 2014: 1576.
23Strictly speaking, this holds for objectual interpretation of quantification. Substitutional
quantification, which was favoured at times by both Kripke and Marcus, might technically avoid
the idea of replacing names for objects. In any case, to get to the conclusion that names are rigid,
one still has to assume at a meta level that names denote whatever they do directly in order to
make sense of them being rigid in the first place.
24Soames 1995: 196-197.
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different views at different times.25 It is not clear whether she really thought
names are Russellian proper names, i.e., directly referential in every context. In the
speech she gave at Boston in 1961, she does give the impression that identities
between proper names are both analytic and a priori.26 During the discussion
following the presentation, she makes a point to Quine that strongly suggests
that this is indeed her view:
Presumably, if a single object had more than one tag, there would be
a way of finding out, such as having recourse to a dictionary or some
analogous inquiry, which would resolve the question as to whether
the two tags denote the same thing.27
Claiming that necessity of identity between co-referential proper names
is necessary also in the sense of analytic and a priori would justify the substitution
not only in alethic contexts, but also in epistemic ones.28 However, this is a rather
inconvenient consequence. As Frege pointed out, the fact that two names refer
to the same object, even if such an identity is necessary, does not mean that a
person should know that they do. A statement of self-identity might be knowable
without empirical investigation, but an identity statement featuring two different
names cannot be known prior to experience. Furthermore, Marcus’ arguments do
not offer a strong enough justification for such a radical thesis.
1.3 Rigidity and the Argument against Descriptivism
It was not Marcus but Kripke who took up the project of giving a non-circular
argument for the rigidity of proper names. His argument simultaneously served
to support the theory of direct reference by dealing a critical blow to the classical
descriptivist theory. Interestingly, Kripke seems to have endorsed Marcus’ ideas
in the discussion at Boston Colloquium29; however, he seems to have changed
25Burgess 2014: 1583.
26Marcus 1993: 33-34.
27Ibid.
28Since Marcus does not make much of a distinction between (metaphysically) "necessary",
"analytic", and "a priori", at least in the case for identities of proper names, this would indeed
mean substitutivity across the board. As we will see, Kripke thought that there are metaphysical
necessities that are neither analytic nor a priori.
29See Marcus 1993: 34-35. Kripke says that Marcus’ dictionary example seems like "a perfectly
valid view". A few moments later, he himself equates necessity with analyticity. In Kripke 1981
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his mind shortly afterwards. In Naming and Necessity, he clearly denies the idea
that identities between names are necessary in the sense that they are analytic or
a priori.
The three different forms of "necessity" - (metaphysically) necessary, an-
alytic, and a priori - had often been confused in the work of Kripke’s predeces-
sors: Carnap, to take an example, explicitly defined alethic necessity as analytic-
ity.30 This is perhaps the reason why Quine’s criticism31 of modal logic was, in
part, justified: there was, to some extent, a confusion between language and the
world. Kripke made it clear that alethic logic concerns metaphysical necessity
which is not coextensive with either analyticity or a priori.32 This clarification of
concepts was an undeniably important advancement in the new theory of refer-
ence.
Kripke also saw the problem of using a logical derivation of necessary
identity to prove rigidity for natural language.33 Indeed, the difficulty in Marcus’
conclusions about the nature of proper names is that they seem to be driven more
by her formal framework than facts about natural language. Marcus’ early works
were lacking the kind of linguistic explanation that was needed for the jump from
logic to language. Kripke’s arguments in Naming and Necessity have a different
(and better justified) direction of explanation, moving from language to its logical
representation.
In theNaming and Necessity lectures and an article published shortly after
the lectures, "Identity and Necessity", Kripke presents several modal arguments.
In "Identity and Necessity", Kripke first gives his definition of rigidity. A term is
a rigid designator, he says, if it designates the same thing, if the thing exists, in
every possible world, and if it does not exist, designates nothing. Stronger ver-
sions of the rigidity thesis have been given in the literature e.g., Kaplan’s sense
of "rigid designator" (or a directly referential term, which, to him, is essentially a
(100-101) he states that the dictionary example must be wrong.
30See e.g. Carnap 1947. Carnap’s view was Tarskian; his definition for necessity was that a
necessary statement in an interpretation is true if and only if it is true in every interpretation. This
definition connected necessity with language rather than the world, making analyticity equiva-
lent with necessity.
31See e.g. Quine 1943, Quine 1976a.
32Kripke 1971.
33Kripke 1981: 3-4.
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synonymous expression) is a term that designates the same object in every possi-
ble world regardless of whether it exists or not.34 In what follows, the notion of
rigidity is interpreted as Kripke rigidity, not Kaplan rigidity.35
Kripke then proposes "a simple, intuitive test" for determining when a
term is a rigid designator and when it is not:
We can say, for example, that the number of planets might have been
a different number from the number it in fact is. For example, there
might have been only seven planets. We can say that the inventor
of bifocals might have been someone other than the man who in fact
invented the bifocals. And it seems that we cannot say, though, that
the square root of 81 might have been a different number from the
number it in fact is, for that number just has to be 9. If we apply this
intuitive test to proper names, such as for example ‘Richard Nixon’,
they would seem intuitively to come out to be rigid designators.36
What Kripke’s argument establishes is a different and a weaker conclusion than
Marcus’ tag theory of names, although it has exactly the same conclusion with
respect to the behaviour of names in alethic modal logic. He argues that the
type of necessity he is concerned with is metaphysical necessity, and that is what
his argument shows - it says nothing about the analyticity or apriority of identity
statements. Kripke, therefore, is not attempting to make the statement that names
are rigid also in epistemic or doxastic contexts, even if he does not give much
thought to why rigidity fails in those contexts either.
Kripke also emphasizes that when counterfactuals are considered, they
are considered from the point of view of the actual world, and the language as
we use it in the actual world. The fact that 2+2 might not have been identical
with something that is called "four" is irrelevant to the rigidity of the terms "2+2"
34See e.g. Kaplan 1989.
35Kaplan (1989: 492-493) does note that Kripke still seems to be implicitly assuming the stronger
reading, namely that the term designates the same thing in every possible world whether it exists
or not. However, it does not matter much for the purpose of this work which reading is assumed.
The distinction between Kripke’s and Kaplan’s notions of direct reference, the latter of which is in
particular connected with the idea of rigidity, however, will be of greater importance and will be
discussed later in this thesis.
36Kripke 1971: 148-149.
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and "4". When referring to Nixon, we are talking about the person who, as things
turned out to be, was given the name Richard Nixon. The fact that his parents
might have named differently does not refute the thesis of rigid designators.37
In essence, the stages in Kripke’s modal argument against descriptivism
are as follows:
1. Proper names designate rigidly.
2. Usually, sentences such as "The F is G" and "n is G", where the referents of
a definite description "The F" and a name "n" are actually the same, might
have different truth values in different possible worlds. While the name is
rigid, the definite description is non-rigid.
3. Therefore a name cannot be synonymous with a definite description.
Kripke did not deny that descriptions could never be used rigidly. Some
descriptions, like his example "the square root of 81" are indeed rigid. His crucial
point was that it is an intrinsic property of ordinary proper names that they are
rigid designators: they are rigid de jure. As Stanley puts it, "[the] intuitive content
of de jure designation lies in the metaphor of "unmediated" reference. A rigid
de jure designator is supposed to denote what it denotes without mediation by
some concept or description."38 "The square root of 81" is, on the other hand,
de facto rigid, i.e., it refers mediately but nevertheless it denotes the same object
(the number nine) in every possible world. Actualized descriptions (such as "the
actual president of France") would be, according to Kripke’s categorization, de
facto rigid as well. Proper names are special because rigidity is built into their
semantics.
It should also be noted that Kripke does not claim that names have no
descriptive content, but that such content would only be relevant for fixing the
reference. What he objects to is that there are descriptions that are synonymous
with, or give themeaning of, a name.39 He criticizes Russell and Frege for holding
the latter view, and accuses Frege on conflating the two notions.40 The fact that
there can be cognitive significance, descriptive or non-descriptive, to a proper
37Kripke 1981: 76-77.
38Stanley 1997a: 557.
39Kripke 1971: 156.
40Kripke 1981: 57-58.
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name, is independent of the fact about whether the name refers directly or is
mediated by a sense.
1.4 Descriptivist Answers and Further Anti-Descriptivist Intu-
itions
The usual descriptivist responses to Kripke’s challenge admit that names are
rigid, but deny that they are rigid de jure, which allows names to have non-rigid
senses. Another strategywould be to argue that names have senses that are them-
selves rigid. One of the earliest responses to Kripke, byMichael Dummett, was of
the first type. Dummett suggested interpreting the rigidity of names as a syntac-
tic, not a semantic feature of them in modal contexts.41 According to Dummett,
rigidity is a matter of the scope of the proper name. Consider, for comparison,
ordinary definite descriptions. Usually, it is intuitive to say that "the President of
France is the President of France" is a necessary sentence, but there is an interpre-
tation under which it is contingent. If someone utters the sentence "the President
of France might have not been the President of France", he could mean that the
person who is in fact the president of France might have not become the Presi-
dent. It is a contingent property of the person who is the President that he is the
President.
In this interpretation, the first "president of France" takes a wide scope
over the modal operator which "rigidifies" (the first occurrence of) the descrip-
tion. The sentence, interpreted this way, can be formalized as 9x(x = ixPx ^
⌃¬x = ixPx). However, to say that "it is possible that whoever is the president
of France is not the president of France" is obviously false, because the first de-
scription occurs inside the scope of the modal operator as well as the second,
i.e., ⌃9x(x = ixPx ^ ¬x = ixPx). As Dummett put it, we can talk about possi-
ble states of affairs or possible properties.42 Extending the idea to proper names,
then, it can be said that names work in exactly the same manner, but they tend to
take the wide scope by convention.
Kripke did acknowledge the possibility of explaining rigidity by scope
41Dummett 1973: Chapter 5, Appendix. Sosa 2001 is a more recent proponent of the wide scope
view.
42Dummett 1973: 125-126.
17
in Naming and Necessity, but he thought it was not a sustainable view.43 Both
he and Soames44 have given another type of a modal argument against the wide
scope conventionalist theory, which can be roughly outlined as follows. Themain
idea of the argument is to "force" the name in the embedded sentence inside the
scope of the modal operator and ask about our intuitions in that case. And it
seems that our intuition is that even in narrow scope, the name refers rigidly
while the description does not. Consider, as an example, the following two sen-
tences:
(3) François Hollande is François Hollande.
(4) François Hollande is the president of France.
Suppose that the wide-scopist argues that "the president of France" is indeed the
sense of "François Hollande".45 Then the two simple sentences (3) and (4) should
be equivalent, since the names themselves are synonymous and no modal oper-
ators are involved. To the wide-scopist, rigidity becomes an issue only in modal
contexts due to the possible scope differences of proper names and corresponding
descriptions.
But if sentences (3) and (4) do not differ from each other in semantic
value, then there are difficulties in explaining why the following sentences do
not seem equivalent:
(5) (3) expresses a necessary truth.
(6) (4) expresses a necessary truth.
The impossibility of explaining why (5) seems to be true and (6) false seems to
refute the idea that the difference of the behaviour of proper names and descrip-
tions in modal contexts could be just a syntactic issue of scope.
Of course, the intuition about our evaluation of (3) and (4) in contexts
43Kripke 1981: 11-13.
44Soames 1998.
45Depending on the particular descriptivist theory, "the president of France" can be substituted
by a suitable description or a union of all such descriptions. E.g., to modify the argument accord-
ing to Searle’s cluster theory of proper names, the single definite descriptionwould be replaced by
some sort of a disjunction-sentence of different properties by which Hollande could be identified.
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such as those in (5) and (6) could be challenged. What Kripke and Soames rely on
is that there are direct intuitions about the modal profile of proper names.46 The
wide-scopist could answer that speakers would automatically interpret (5) with
the name taking awide scope, even if it would seem, on the surface, to be a de dicto
sentence.47 There has also been some protests against Soames’ treating sentences
of the form (5) and (6) as if they contained a modal adverb (such as "necessarily")
while they in fact contain a modal predicate.48 But the wide-scope solution still
leaves open questions about the interpretation of syntactically de dicto sentences.
For if it is claimed that all modal sentences of natural language that involve names
have a logical structure where the name takes a wide scope over the modal oper-
ator, then syntactically correct structures such as⇤9x(x = a ^ F(x)), where a is a
proper name, do not seem to mean anything at all. If it meant "necessarily, a is F"
then it would, according to the wide-scopist, have the form 9x(x = a ^⇤F(x)),
which is not (for the wide-scopist) equivalent to ⇤9x(x = a ^ F(x)).49 So it can-
not mean that. Is the bare de dicto form then somehow syntactically forbidden?
Or is the de dicto sentence simply meaningless? These questions, I think, are not
irrelevant.
Wide-scopism is not the only possible defense that a descriptivist can
reach out for. E.g. Jason Stanley, having noticed the problems with wide-scopism,
has suggested another solution based on another idea of Dummett’s, making a
distinction between the "assertoric content" and the "ingredient sense" of a sen-
tence.50 He describes the two notions as follows:
"The assertoric content of an utterance of a sentence is what is said
by that utterance. The assertoric content of an utterance of a sentence
46E.g. Kripke 1981 12-14.
47E.g. Sosa 2001 mentions this line of defense.
48Hunter 2005 expresses this type of opinion, although it seems that his grounds are not as
solid as they could be. Caplan 2005 criticizes Hunter’s view, attempting to show that whether a
sentence has a modal adverb or a modal predicate does not change the fact that the wide-scopist
has to commit on the name taking a wide scope over the operator.
49Assuming that the wide-scopist denies that any natural language sentences of necessity
would have proper names in narrow scope, regardless of their surface structure. If he would
accept that there are true narrow scope occurrences of proper names, then he would have to
face the Soames/Kripke argument once again in explaining why the narrow-scope occurrences of
names would not be rigid.
50Stanley 1997a: 574-578; see also Stanley 1997b.
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also is the object of belief, doubt, and other propositional attitudes.
Assertoric contents are the fundamental bearers of truth-value. [...]
The ingredient sense of a sentence is what that sentence contributes
to more complex sentences of which it is a part. The ingredient sense
of a sentence is thus that sentence’s compositional semantic value. It
is the semantic value we must assign to a sentence in order to predict
correctly the conditions under which more complex constructions in
which it occurs are true.51
It is possible, Stanley argues, that these two aspects of sentence meaning
could come apart: sentences with same assertoric contents might have different
ingredient senses, and ingredient senses might not be able to serve as assertoric
contents.52 Clearly, this would be what happens in alethic modal contexts.
Even if such a distinction can be made, in order for Stanley’s argument
to go through, he has to assume that assertoric contents cannot be evaluated in
alethic modal sentences. But this is not a given: if Kripke and Soames are right
about there being direct intuitions about the semantics of proper names, then it
is indeed the assertoric contents of the embedded simple sentences that are eval-
uated modally. As Kripke puts it, his view is "a doctrine about the truth condi-
tions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of (the propositions expressed by)
all sentences, including simple sentences."53 The claim that assertoric contents are
not what simple sentences contribute to modal contexts is incompatible with this
idea, and therefore it can only be justified if Kripke’s and Soames’ intuitions are
incorrect. The intuitions, as will be later shown, are indeed not as strong as they
could be, and they are contradicted by some direct evidence from actual language
use. But this is not yet enough to confirm Stanley’s theory.
In a more recent criticism of descriptivist theories, Everett directly ar-
gues that Stanley cannot prove that assertoric contents would be never evaluated
modally.54 The argument, which I will give a somewhat simplified version of, has
a similar strategy as Soames’ argument against wide-scopism. Everett’s aim is to
show that there are contexts where the assertoric content of a simple sentence is
51Stanley 1997a: 575.
52Ibid.
53Kripke 1981: 12.
54Everett 2005.
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"forced" into the evaluation of a modal contexts. Everett first notes that sentences
of the form
(7) Hesperus is not Phosphorus. John believes it but it is necessarily false.
are perfectly grammatical (even if slightly clumsy), and furthermore, they do not
have the awkward feel of sentences that are cases of syllepsis, e.g. "some of the
bankswere highly eroded away and some closed for the holiday".55 Thus it seems
that "it" actually refers to the same thing in the sentence following "Hesperus is
Phosphorus". But what is evaluated in the belief statement has be the assertoric
content. This seems to support the intuitions that assertoric contents (or Kripke’s
"simple sentences") can indeed evaluated modally.
Everett’s argument is a rather nasty twist on the Hintikka-Kripke prob-
lem which will be introduced in the next section. As long as our intuitions sup-
port the fact that the two occurrences of "it" have the same reference, it does not
matter whether the thesis of intrinsic rigidity is refuted. If John is to have a be-
lief at all, also the thesis of de facto alethic rigidity needs to be given up, and this
makes the problem a more difficult one than that of mixed modal contexts. This
issue, that can be shown to apply also to the switcher semantics model that is in
this thesis presented as a solution to the Hintikka-Kripke problem (whether or
not a descriptivist theory of meaning is endorsed), will be returned to in the final
chapter of the thesis.
A different tactic would be to argue that names have rigid senses, which
makes them indeed inherently rigid regardless of scope. The meanings of proper
names are given in terms of actualized or rigidified descriptions. Thus, the sense
of the name is not only a general description, but contains an indexical element.
To give a simplified example, the sense of the name "François Hollande" could
be "the actual President of France". The description is rigid exactly as the name
is, picking out the same person - that is, the man who is Hollande - in every
possible world. This would require interpreting the rigidity of names in Kripke’s,
not Kaplan’s, way, necessarily designating the same object in the worlds in which
the object exists.56 Actualized descriptions are clearly not Kaplan-rigid. This is a
small objection compared to Soames’ more powerful argument against rigidified
55Everett 2005: 131.
56Soames 1998: 14.
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descriptions.57 It is based on the idea that not only actual-world inhabitants, but
also inhabitants of other possible worlds can have beliefs about Hollande. In
those cases, it is conceivable that those people existing in the realm of possibilia
have thoughts and belief about Hollande without having any thoughts about the
actual world. The meaning of "Hollande", then, is no longer the same as "the
actual President of France".58
Whether another variety of the rigidified description theory can over-
come these difficulties is another question. Soames notes that rigidifying the
description in the style of Kaplan’s dthat-operator might work59, and there are
some more contemporary varieties of the theory that are less loyal to the classical
Fregean view of sense.60 In any case, Soames’ example underlines the difficulties
that arise especially in mixed modal contexts. These contexts are not problematic
only to descriptivist theories, however: also direct referentialists need additional
tools of explanation to make sense of them. Giving a unified theory of alethic
modal contexts and propositional attitudes is so far one of the hardest problems
for both descriptivists and direct referentialists. The rest of this thesis will fo-
cus on the particular problem of making sense of combined alethic and doxastic
modalities.
2 The Hintikka-Kripke Problem
Frege’s puzzle took propositional attitudes as its starting point and concluded
that names must have senses. Kripke’s metalinguistic argument started from a
convincing intuition about (alethic) modal reasoning and concluded that names
must be intrinsically rigid, and therefore they cannot have Fregean senses. But
while Frege’s theory does not seem to be able to explain the behaviour of names
in alethic contexts, it is quite obvious that the Kripkean intuitions are no longer
correct when propositional attitudes such as belief are considered. The dispar-
57Soames 1998: 14-15.
58A variant of this argument, as will be seen, can also be constructed against the switcher se-
mantics view. It is discussed later in this work together with Everett’s argument, although unlike
the latter, it can be quite easily solved, provided that one is not a classical descriptivist.
59Soames 1998: 17.
60See e.g. Nelson 2002. Nelson endorses a mental file type of approach combined with the idea
that some mental files can be indexed to the actual world.
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ity between alethic and epistemic or doxastic contexts is sometimes called "the
Hintikka-Kripke problem" after the two great developers of epistemic and alethic
logic.
Let us exemplify the problem with the following two sentences:
(8) If Hesperus is Phosphorus, then it is necessary that Hesperus is Phospho-
rus.
(9) If Hesperus is Phosphorus, then John believes that Hesperus is Phospho-
rus.
Doxastic logic is often modeled in possible world semantics. In terms of these se-
mantics, the first sentence says that if Hesperus is Phosphorus, then in all (meta-
physically) possible worlds Hesperus is Phosphorus. The second says the same in
doxastic terms: if Hesperus is Phosphorus, then Hesperus is Phosphorus in every
doxastically possible world (for an agent).1 The two sentences can be expressed
more formally as
(10) Hesperus = Phosphorus! ⇤Hesperus = Phosphorus
(11) Hesperus = Phosphorus! BjHesperus = Phosphorus
If Kripke’s metalinguistic argument is accepted, then (8) should indeed be always
true, and correspondingly, (10) should be valid. But (9) clearly is not always true,
and thus (11), if it is the correct interpretation of (9), should not be valid. It should
not follow from the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus that John believes it to be
true. He might not even know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are! But it
follows from the fact that (10) is valid and (11) is not that i) if Hesperus is Phos-
phorus, there are no alethically possible worlds in which Hesperus is Phosphorus
and ii) even if Hesperus is Phosphorus, there can be doxastically possible worlds
where this is not the case. Since Hesperus and Phosphorus are in fact identical,
this means that there can be doxastically possible worlds that are not alethically
possible. But what does it even mean for there to be a possible world that is not
1See Appendix I for a brief introduction to relational or "possible worlds" semantics for modal
logic. Although the term "relational semantics" is probably a better one, I will use the latter term
more often to distinguish between standard modal semantics and the specific idea of relational
modality models in standard semantics.
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metaphysically, i.e., alethically possible?
There are three general approaches to the problem. Direct referential-
ists, who tend to hold on to rigidity - direct reference and non-rigidity are often
seen as incompatible2 - would have to accept that both (10) and (11) are valid and
then explain away the counterintuitiveness. The descriptivist has the choice of
maintaining the invalidity of (11), but if the validity of (10) is to be accepted, the
"special semantics" for propositional attitudes, and the case of metaphysically im-
possible doxastic worlds, needs to be explained.3 Finally, there is the possibility
of trying to get the best of the bothworlds and claiming that (9) contains unarticu-
lated constituents that must be taken into account when formalizing the sentence:
therefore (11) is not the correct formalization of (9). Because of the difficulties of
the descriptivist theories illustrated above, the directly referential approach and
the unarticulated constituents approach have perhaps been more popular than
descriptivist accounts. In this chapter, the direct reference and descriptivist views
and their challenges will be briefly considered, and a longer section will be de-
voted to unarticulated constituents view, which seems to escape many types of
problems that the former two theories have to face. Despite its virtues, there are
other types of problems with the theory that make it theoretically unsatisfying.
These problems can be easily seen to arise precisely from the attempt to maintain
the intrinsic rigidity thesis. Once this feature is disposed of, a more efficient the-
ory that respects the intuition behind the unarticulated constituents theory while
containing no unnecessary linguistic entities can be constructed.
2.1 Are "Special" Semantics Needed?
If the first route of accepting both sentences as valid is taken, then the counter-
intuitivity of (9) has to be explained with appeal to pragmatics, possibly along
the lines of Gricean conversational maxims.4 It could be said that even if (11)
can be said to be valid, it would be misleading to attribute beliefs to a person
only because there are true identity statements involving proper names. (9) is,
2Whether they actually are is another question which I will briefly take up in the latter part of
this thesis.
3The term "special semantics" has been borrowed from Holliday and Perry 2014.
4For Russellian-Gricean kind of analyses of propositional attitudes, see e.g. Salmon 1986,
Soames 1987.
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therefore, not the full story. There is a vast contextual background which ex-
plains why one would not attribute the belief that "Hesperus is Phosphorus" to
the agent on the sole ground that the statement is necessary. However, even if
the pragmatist approach were accepted as a plausible thesis in the particular case
of the Hintikka-Kripke problem, it would produce many results that are unsatis-
factory to the modal logician. Consider Kripke’s puzzle, in which a person has
two contradictory beliefs about the city London.5 The Frenchman, failing to see
that the city Londres is the same as the city London, believes that London (as Lon-
dres) is pretty, and that London (as London) is unpretty. A pragmatist who wants
to assimilate the semantics of alethic and doxastic logic would have to say that
Ba(P(l) ^ ¬P(l)) (where P(l): "London is pretty") is true6, amounting to there
being a doxastically possible world in which the logical contradiction is true.7 In
classical logic, this is an unacceptable consequence, since a contradiction has a
property of "spreading" throughout the system, making true every proposition
whatsoever. In order to avoid the explosion world created by the contradiction,
substantial changes to doxastic logic have to be made.
There are clearly cases where epistemic and doxastic logics have to "ide-
alize". After all, the exact behaviour of natural language is incredibly difficult to
replicate in a formal language without sacrificing clarity and functionality. The
problem of logical omniscience, perhaps first mentioned by Hintikka8, is one of
the problems that result from the idealized nature of these logics. Its general form
is this. Let us suppose that (i) a believes that j, and suppose also that (ii) j ! y
is a logical truth. Now, it is perfectly possible that (iii) a does not believe that y.
From (iii) it follows that there has to be a doxastically possible world v for a such
that y is false in v - and thus ¬y has to be true in v. Since j ! y is a logical truth,
it is true in all possible worlds, and thus also in v. But by (i), j has to be true in
all possible worlds accessible to a, and therefore also in v. If both j and j ! y
are true in v, then by Modus Ponens, y is true. Since it was established that ¬y is
5See Kripke 1979.
6By the theorem (Bap ^ Baq) ! Ba(p ^ q) of the modal logic K.
7Of course, one could reject the Translation Principle by which "London" in English means the
same as "Londres" in French. However, there are variants of Kripke’s puzzle which do not invoke
this principle. One of them (the "Paderewski case") is given in Kripke’s original article about the
puzzle.
8Hintikka 1962.
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also true in v, we have y ^ ¬y true in v, which means that v has to be a logically
impossible world at least by the principles classical of logic. In order to get rid
of the impossible world, it simply has to be assumed that agents know all logical
tautologies, and thus do not believe contradictions.
However, there is more at stake in the Hintikka-Kripke problem. A sen-
tence of the type a = b ! Baa = b is necessary but not a priori. Therefore, an
agent’s believing any true identity statement a = b where a and b are proper
names is not a matter of logical omniscience as it is commonly understood.9 Lin-
sky notes that if an agent should know all such statements then he would be
metaphysically omniscient, making him not only a perfect logician but also some-
thing of a god.10 This is no longer an idealization but a complete distortion of
human knowledge.
But accepting (10) as valid and (11) as invalid is troublesome as well.
First of all, the idea of there being impossible worlds can be seen as problematic
in itself. Linsky describes one analysis of the case as follows:
Hesperus (= Phosphorus) is (are?) two objects in the world described
by the sentences. It is not just that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are
names of different objects, for that is easily enough understood. The
problem is that in this world Hesperus (= Phosphorus) is not Phos-
phorus (= Hesperus). That cannot be understood at all.11
There is something suspicious about talking about "metaphysical impos-
sibility" in the case of someone having a mistaken belief about identity between
two proper names. The assumption behind the concretist account is that belief
contents represent states of affairs, and that belief contents that are impossible
represent possibly existing states of affairs that are impossible. But this does not
98x8y(x = y ! ⇤x = y) is, if we accept Leibniz’ law, a theorem of modal logic and should
thus be believed by any agent, making it a case of logical omniscience. However, as was explained
in the previous sections, it is not a matter of pure logic that we can proceed to the instantiation a =
b! ⇤a = bwhere a and b are ordinary proper names. This is an empirical matter, distinguishing
it from knowledge of logical truths. To justify the move from necessary identity to necessity
of identity statements between names in doxastic or epistemic contextswould need a metalinguistic
argument in the style of Kripke’s analogous argument for alethic contexts. As theHintikka-Kripke
problem shows, it is muchmore controversial if there if any such argument can plausibly be given.
10Linsky 1979: 93.
11Ibid.: 92.
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seem completely proper way to talk about issues that are, in the end, semantic.
In order to get from non-necessary identities between names to splitting objects,
one has to assume that names are directly referential in the strongest sense, i.e., in
the sense that they contribute nothing else to the proposition they are embedded in than
their designated objects. But this, as we saw, cannot be simply taken for granted,
and it is not even clear whether Kripke would have agreed with this definition of
direct reference.12
Without taking a stand on the metaphysical issues which may or may
not be present in the problem, the whole idea of "special semantics" for doxastic
logic gets troublesome when one considers mixed modal contexts. The problems
in interpreting such contexts show why there cannot be "special" semantics for
propositional attitudes, since there is no possibility of combining such semantics
with "normal" alethic semantics in a logic that contains both types of operators.
Since it is theoretically dubious to have a separate semantics for alethic mixed-
context cases, an approach that can give a unified account of alethic logic both
on its own and as a part of a multimodal system is preferable. I will argue that
an approach that gives up universal rigidity of proper names is better than an
approach that maintains rigidity but uses unarticulated constituents to explain
issues with doxastic and mixed contexts. My argument will have more to do
with Kripke’s conception of rigidity than the idea of unarticulated constituents
per se; however, one such account and its problems will be briefly considered in
the following section.
12Holliday and Perry (2014) seem to argue that the only alternative to the concretist approach
of the problem is the interpretational (as opposed to the representational approach that they take
Linsky to describe) interpretation (see Etchemendy 1990), i.e., that the problem is only about
the possible uses of language. As Kripke insists, the talk about modalities cannot be talk about
possible languages. Although I agree about the "representational" character of alethic modalities,
I am doubtful whether this black-and-white distinction between heavy concretism and any other
kind of account is correct, and whether there is a way to make a clear-cut division between "the
world as it stands" and "the language". In any case, the account I am going to present shares
many similarities with Holliday and Perry’s semi-descriptivist theory, which will also be briefly
introduced, and thus probably falls outside the scope of their criticism.
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2.2 Mixed Modalities and Unarticulated Constituents
When doxastic and alethic operators are combined in a sentence, names in alethic
contexts seem to inherit features from names in doxastic contexts when embed-
ded in such a contexts. Consider two examples:
(12) It is possible that John believes that Hesperus is not Phosphorus.
(13) John believes that it is possible that Hesperus is not Phosphorus.
(12) is not problematic for special semantics theories. If it is formalized as
⌃BjHesperus 6= Phosphorus, then it says that in some metaphysically possible
counterfactual situation, in all of the belief-worlds accessible to John, Hesperus
is not Phosphorus. Because such theories would allow for the existence of such
worlds, however they are interpreted, the sentence is perfectly acceptable. Sen-
tence (13), on the other hand, cannot be formalized as a satisfiable sentence. A for-
malization corresponding to the logical form of (13), Bj⌃Hesperus 6= Phosphorus,
says that in all of John’s belief-worlds, there is some alethically possible world
in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus. But the special semantics theory denies
the existence of such impossible worlds. Clearly John can have such a belief, and
therefore there has to be something wrong with the special semantics approach
to bimodal contexts.
The conclusion of considering these types of examples is clear: one has
to either accept that names are rigid all the way, or possibly non-rigid with re-
spect to both alethic and doxastic worlds. Interpreted in the standard way, the
first option was shown to be highly counterintuitive and logically problematic.
The second option involves denying the de jure rigidity, as well as de facto rigid-
ity, of proper names across the board. There is a third possibility that has not
yet been considered. This approach maintains rigidity in alethic and doxastic
contexts but nevertheless avoids the Hintikka-Kripke problem by appealing to
speakers’ "cognitive fix" being a part of a belief sentence. In a recent article, Hol-
liday and Perry formalize a system that is based on the idea of such unarticu-
lated constituents in belief statements.13 The main idea of Holliday and Perry’s
is that what contributes to the Hintikka-Kripke problem is that the standard for-
13Holliday and Perry 2014.
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malization of doxastic statements erroneously omits an irreducible unarticulated
constituent to beliefs which is the cognitive fix of the believer.
This idea is familiar from Perry’s work on roles or role-networks. Crim-
mins and Perry have earlier characterized cognitive fix as that which is attempted
to be captured by notions such as senses, mental files, or language of thought, all
of which "[reflect] a firm intuition about the mind, namely, that having beliefs
about an individual means having beliefs involving an internal something that
is one’s cognitive "fix" on the individual."14 However, Holliday and Perry argue
that rejecting direct reference of proper names is too high a price for intension-
alizing belief, and instead aim for a solution that can maintain the best of both
worlds.
The proposed solution divides doxastic logic into two levels. First of
all, there is the world as it stands, represented by the commonly agreed use of
language. Then there is the subjective viewpoint of the agent, contributing to how
he interprets the world. The authors’ objective is to retain the semantics of alethic
logic in their bimodal solution while altering the syntax for belief statements to
explain the cognitive fix.
Holliday and Perry utilize Fitting’s interpretation of intensional logic to
formalize these ideas.15 Their bimodal intensional model structures for quanti-
fied modal logic are of the formM = hW,Ra,Rd,Do,Di, Ii. They are exactly like
the normal modal models, except for the added intensional domain Di of func-
tions from W to Do.16 Furthermore, there are two accessibility relations Ra and
Rd representing alethic and doxastic alternatives respectively. It is crucial that all
doxastically possible worlds are also assumed to be alethically (metaphysically)
possible. The system has two kinds of variables to be quantified over, objectual
variables and intensional variables or role variables, as Holliday and Perry call
them. Object variables xi are given an assignment µ(xi) 2 Do and intensional
14Crimmins and Perry 1989: 694.
15Fitting 2006. For the sake of consistency with the rest of the thesis, my notation follows Fit-
ting’s; the differences to Holliday and Perry’s system are superficial.
16This kind of structure of intensional logic for Kripke models has been used by many recent
logicians, e.g. Fitting and Garson; e.g. Montague has worked in slightly different models but
by the same principle (see Garson 2005, Montague 1970). The same idea dates back to Carnap’s
conceptual framework of modal logic (see Carnap 1947), although its original structure has been
given up for the more convenient possible world semantics of Kripke and Hintikka.
29
variables fi some µ( fi) 2 Di. Interpretations of names are always individual ob-
jects, i.e., I(c) 2 Do. Similarly, all predicates only contain objects as in normal
objectual models, except for the denotation predicate, which is a binary relation
of the type D(ti, fi)where ti is a name or an object variable and fi is an intensional
variable. This is interpreted by Holliday and Perry as "the term ti plays the role
fi for the agent". The fact that the interpretation of a name is always an object is
especially crucial to their system. It reflects the idea that proper names stay rigid
in doxastic logic as well as alethic logic. Truth conditions for the language are as
in a normal quantified modal logic, and intensional quantifiers work exactly in
the same way with respect to the domain of intensions as objectual quantifiers do
with respect to the domain of objects.17
As we can see, Holliday and Perry’s approach keeps the semantics of
objectual quantification intact, adding only a layer of intensional variables on top
of it. In their logic, the only genuine terms are names and object variables, with
intensional role variables only occurring in the denotation predicate. However,
proper names do not feature independently in any belief statement: they are al-
ways paired with an intension by the denotation predicate. In order for the agent
to have a belief about some thing or person, that thing or person has to play some
role for the agent. Because of this, there is no longer any need to postulate im-
possible worlds in order to make sense of the Hintikka-Kripke problem. What is
a doxastic possibility can be a metaphysical possibility as well.
Because of the uniform rigidity of names in alethic and doxastic logic,
Holliday and Perry’s system has no problem in interpreting mixed sentences.
The translation of (13), in their language, would be roughly equivalent to
(14) 9 f9g(D(Hesperus, f )^D(Phosphorus, g)^ Bj⌃9x9y(D(x, f )^D(y, g)^
x 6= y))
The formula is rather complicated, but it is perfectly consistent with "Hesperus"
and "Phosphorus" being rigid designators and John holding the belief that the
stars are not identical.
In other words, the solution manages to retain the rigidity of names
in all contexts while allowing for the cognitive fix of agents. But this indepen-
17For a more detailed description, see Holliday and Perry 2014.
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dence of proper names of intensional variables comes at a price. In Holliday and
Perry’s logic, since sentences such as Hesperus = Phosphorus ! BaHesperus =
Phosphorus are valid, it is still doxastically necessary that Hesperus is Phospho-
rus, even if the agent did not believe it. The fact that there are such statements
containing "bare" names is a direct consequence of the fact that alethically possi-
ble worlds overlap with doxastically possible worlds. These bare names, despite
occurring in some doxastically necessary statements, do not mean anything for
the agent unless they are paired with an intension. In short, doxastic necessity by
itself no longer means belief.
This problem resembles the difficulty of wide-scopism described earlier.
Both syntactic solutions raised question about seemingly valid propositions that
do not appear to have an interpretation in the system. Neither wide-scopists nor
Holliday and Perry would like to say that such forms are somehow forbidden.
But to say that they simply lack meaning is not a particularly satisfying solutions.
If bare names have no role in doxastic statement, then why even use them there?
Holliday and Perry obviously acknowledge the seeming weirdness in
the idea, but they argue that it is nevertheless not necessary that there should be
a one-to-one correspondence between ordinary language sentences and sentences
in logic. They quote Lewis: "why must every logical form find an expression in
ordinary language?"18 Their problem, however, is not as innocent as the quote
makes it seem. The question is, is there any real function for bare proper names?
On the basis that they do not ever feature in beliefs, it is fair to say that there is
not. Whatever semantic role they claim to have is redundant in doxastic logic:
the denotation predicate could be eliminated in favour of interpreting names as
intensions, for that is how they essentially operate in belief statements.19 In addi-
tion to the problem of bare names in doxastic contexts, Holliday and Perry cannot
explain how their role functions relate to the alethic part of their logic. In effect,
their alethic logic speaks of bare names and their doxastic logic speaks of inten-
sions, since that is what role functions pairedwith names, the only kind of entities
18Lewis 1977: 360, quoted in Holliday and Perry 2014: 614.
19This is of course a solution that requires some additional conditions on the system due to
its possibly containing non-rigid terms. What is relevant is that even if less simple in syntax,
the semantics for such an approach would portray belief without postulating additional entities
without any de facto function.
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allowed into belief statements, represent.
The ideal of conserving de jure rigidity in doxastic logic while building
additional layers on top of it is problematic. It seems that such systems are moti-
vated only by the desire to assimilate andmerge doxastic logic to the more simple
and straightforward form of alethic logic. This creates artificiality and semantic
slack, as shown in Holliday and Perry’s system. They avoid non-rigid names for
the fear of giving up the theory of direct reference. At the same time, they are
tempted to retain the less troublesome part of the description theory, namely the
first thesis of intension being the cognitive content of the name, while rejecting
the stronger thesis that intension determines the reference of the name. While
the theory is clearly better than the special semantics descriptivism, its semantic
problems could be seen as an indicator that maintaining de jure rigidity of proper
names is perhaps a misled goal.
I suggest that this goal should be given up. To see why it is safe to do so,
we must return to the root of the problem with rigidity. The metalinguistic argu-
ment of Kripke’s is very compelling and seems to describe our modal intuitions
correctly. However, the conclusion usually drawn, that names need to have rigid-
ity built into their semantics, does not simply follow from the plausibility of the
argument itself. As I mentioned earlier, these "direct intuitions" need to be sep-
arately justified. While it is true that the standard way to use names in (alethic)
modal reasoning is rigid or de re, this is not evidence for rigidity being an intrinsic
property of names. In fact, the direct intuitions about simple sentences that are
quoted in arguments against wide-scopism are based on relatively simple cases,
and once one considers a wider variety of examples, the idea that names could
never be non-rigid seems too strict.20
20To clarify what has already been mentioned before, Kripke never claimed that names are
rigid in epistemic contexts. All in all, he said very little about proper names in propositional
attitude contexts. However, formalizations such as Holliday and Perry’s seem to assume that
names must be rigid in any context whatsoever, which is precisely the reason for their having to
adopt additional intensional variables to make sense of apparent non-rigid occurrences of proper
names.
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3 Improper Names and Improper Uses
The fact that proper names are rigid designators is commonly considered to be
"an empirical discovery".1 The evidence supporting this discovery is, in essence,
the metalinguistic argument introduced in Chapter 1.3. The argument is sup-
posed to rest on our "common intuitions". While the argument indeed seems
highly intuitive, it is less clear whether the intuitions in question concern the
semantics or proper names or something else. Why does it seem intuitive that
Aristotle could not have failed to be Aristotle? The further claim that there are
intuitions about the rigidity of names in simple sentences is less obvious than the
initial argument. Many philosophers, often descriptivists, have consequentially
accepted de facto rigidity (which is what is proven by the metalinguistic argu-
ment) more easily than de jure rigidity.
To which extent one can take linguistic intuitions of native speakers -
or linguists and philosophers of language - as straight evidence about semantics
is a difficult issue. They are important, but it is not always the case that speak-
ers can correctly identify their theoretical intuitions about some linguistic issue.
Therefore it is important to explicate the intuitions in themetalinguistic argument
(and further "direct intuitions") first in terms of which types of sentences would
be accepted by speakers, and then which semantic explanations they give for the
acceptability or unacceptability. It is clear that the former can be taken as more
reliable than the latter, and that if the two clearly conflict, then it is probably the
latter that is erroneous.
My aim is not to deny the existence of correct semantic intuitions of
proper names and modal contexts; that would require a much longer study in
philosophy of language and linguistics. However, if there were intuitions about
non-rigidity in simple or modal sentences, it would directly challenge Kripke’s
and Soames’ claims. In particular, if there were non-theoretical speaker intuitions
about the correctness of non-rigid uses of proper names, this would provide a
strong case against Kripke’s and Soames’ further intuitions about simple sen-
tences. The aim, then, is to examine the evidence supporting non-rigid or "non-
referential" uses of proper names in rather natural contexts other than proposi-
tional attitudes.
1Stanley 1997a: 555.
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Showing that names allow for non-standard uses like this is an impor-
tant part of the main argument of this thesis, since it will give the justification
of separating between two modes of evaluation, rigid and non-rigid, for proper
names inmodal contexts. If speakers truly had reliable intuitions about the intrin-
sic rigidity of proper names, then there could not be any non-rigid interpretation
of them. But there are many ordinary cases where there is some degree of inde-
terminacy about the referent, and thus also natural non-rigidity. Many of these
examples have been called "non-referential" or "attributive" uses of proper names,
analogous to the attributive use of descriptions. It is not certain whether this is
an analogue that is perfectly accurate, and whether these examples can then be
used as a refutation of direct referentialism has been questioned in the literature.
I believe that the perceived non-referentiality (or, as I would prefer, indetermi-
nacy of reference) of such uses of names comes from their presumed non-rigid
modal profile. Regardless, this kind of examples show that our direct intuitions
of rigidity are not always so clear.
3.1 The Metalinguistic Argument Revisited
The first "intuitive test" involving Nixon in "Identity and Necessity", and the sim-
ilar example in Naming and Necessity, concern speakers’ intuitions about proper
names in explicitly modal contexts. In the preface toNaming and Necessity, Kripke
also claims that there are similar intuitions with respect to names in simple, non-
modal sentences.2 But are there? While it was hard to argue against the intuitions
about rigidity in alethic modal contexts, the case at hand is far less clear. Dum-
mett, against whom Kripke’s criticism was mainly targeted, simply denied the
existence of these intuitions.3 Even if Dummett’s response was perhaps unfair,
Kripke does demand quite a high level of sophistication from ordinary speakers,
and his second argument has not been accepted by everyone.
The modal argument against wide-scopism relies exactly on the second
type of intuitions. When Soames4 adds the "it is necessary that" in front of the
simple sentence, he presupposes that the speaker can actually read the name in
a narrow scope and express his intuitions about that case. But this is just to pre-
2Kripke 1981: 12-14.
3Dummett 1981: 582.
4Soames 1998.
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suppose that speakers do have direct intuitions about proper names in simple
contexts. If they did not, one could say that speakers interpret the narrow-scope
constructions in wide scope.5 Therefore it is not clear whether the argument in
fact proves, without any sort of circularity, the existence of direct intuitions about
proper names.
Do speakers - apart from Kripke and Soames themselves - indeed have
these intuitions? If they truly do, can they be trusted at face value? There is
an extensive literature on speaker intuitions as evidence in general linguistics.6
What is the role of intuitions as linguistic evidence is a difficult question. To take
an example from linguistics: on one hand, questions such as what constitutes a
grammatical sentence are, and should be, weighed in terms of native speakers’
intuitions. On the other hand, interpreting such intuitions is very difficult. It
is one thing to trust a native speaker when he calls a sentence ungrammatical,
and another to trust his explanation of why it is ungrammatical. Speakers are
not necessarily capable of making highly theoretical distinctions between seman-
tics of names and semantics of modal contexts in general, distinctions between
pragmatic and semantic issues and the like.7
A native speaker’s semantic intuitions are important data, but whether
they should be taken "at face value" is not as clear. Cohnitz and Haukioja make
a useful distinction between (ordinary people’s) intuitions having an evidential
or constitutive role.8 People’s intuitions with respect to physics might convey
some correct information of how middle-sized physical objects work, but giving
these intuitions a constitutive role would amount to a theory of folk physics, which
is not a particularly fruitful theory. Even the intuitions of the experts - linguists,
physicists, and so on - should be used as a starting point for inquiry and subject to
careful evaluation as further evidence is collected. Kent Bach draws an instructive
analogy:
To “preserve intuitions” in our theorizing about what is said would be
like relying on the intuitions of unsophisticated moviegoers about the
effects of editing on a film. Although people’s cinematic experience is
5Due to it being the convention. This is what was suggested in Sosa 2001.
6See e.g. Fodor 1981, 1998; Schütze 1996; Devitt 2006.
7Bach 2002a, 2002b.
8Cohnitz and Haukioja 2015: 620-621.
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dramatically affected by such factors as cuts and camera angles, there
is no reason to suppose that their intuitions are reliable about what
produces what effects. Intuitions about what is said may be similarly
insensitive to the difference between the contribution that is made by
the semantic content of a sentence and that made by extralinguistic
factors to what an utterance communicates.9
Interestingly, as Bach notes, speakers’ insensitivity to theoretical differences is
referred to by both Salmon and Soames as a reason why substitutivity seems to
fail in propositional attitude contexts.10
The moral is, perhaps, that one should not put too much trust on the-
oretical intuitions. As expressed by Fodor: "informants, one-self included, can
be quite awful at saying what it is that drives their intuitions. [...] It is always
up for grabs what an intuition is an intuition of."11 Furthermore, what intuitions
- theoretical or not - people have about a particular case might vary depending
on how much information they are given about the case.12 One should be cau-
tious when citing intuitions as evidence, be they theoretical (semantic) or direct.
Nevertheless, linguistics has to be based on empirical evidence. The best basis
for evidence about the correct theory of reference (or modalities) is more likely
to be found from the use of names, not in how people think they use them (i.e.,
which theory of reference they prefer). As Martí notes, even if Russell and Mill
disagreed about the correct theory of reference, they nevertheless have used lan-
guage in exactly the same way.13
The direct evidence that the "intuitions" about the metalinguistic argu-
ment seems to establish is at least this. It is rather clear, even without empirical
data, that speakers tend to see sentences such as "nmight have not been n", where
n is name, false and sentences such as "nmight have not been d", where d is an ac-
tual description of n, usually as true. No other types of statements are mentioned
in the argument itself. It is in fact interesting that Kripke does not consider exam-
ples with different but co-referential names, such as "Aurore Dupin" and "George
Sand", in his metalinguistic argument. Do we have such clear intuitions about
9Bach 2002b: 24.
10Bach 2002a: 86. See e.g. Salmon 1986, Soames 2002.
11Fodor 1998: 86. Quote in Bach 2002b.
12Williams 2001: 15-16.
13Martí 2009: 45.
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"Aurore Dupin might have not been George Sand"? In Kripke’s defense, it could
be said that there are few people who have several different names (nicknames
aside), and noms de plume are, in a sense, a special case. In any case, our intuitions
should also generally confirm that "nmight have not been n’", where n and n’ are
two coreferential names, is false.
This picture, however, might be too simplistic. In the next section, I will
examine a variety of cases of "deviant" uses of proper names that do not conform
to Kripke’s and Soames’ direct intuitions. Moreover, these cases go beyond the
usual suspects of descriptive names and propositional attitudes. It has been ac-
knowledged by most philosophers that the so-called "descriptive names" do not
function quite like ordinary proper names, but this together with the artificiality
of most example cases has led many to deny that descriptive names are a sub-
type of proper names in the first place. But the fact that the most ordinary proper
names can have improper uses cannot be explained away in the same manner.
I will argue that in the face of this evidence, the right thing to do is to give up
the rigidity requirement of proper names themselves and turn to the semantics of
modal contexts, which is where the problem originated in the first place.
3.2 Using Proper Names Improperly
An additional issue with many examples of the direct referentialists, even when
considered solely from the point of view of language use (such as the basic met-
alinguistic argument), is that they are quite narrow and rather simplistic. As Bach
notes, "referentialists tend to survive on a lean diet of examples".14 A majority of
the most famous examples in the literature concern people’s given names, and
many less orderly types of proper names are disregarded. Unfortunately, also the
examples that are intended to oppose the common view of proper names, such
as descriptive names, are often rather artificial.
Many of the earlier arguments against rigidity have used what could be
called improper names as an example, perhaps because the inventors of those ar-
guments have been more focused on attacking the new theory of reference and
not the idea of rigid designators per se. Their aim is to show that there is a sub-
category of proper names that simply have to have descriptive semantic content.
14Bach 2002a: 77.
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The best known examples concern descriptively introduced names, e.g. Evans’
Julius.15 Linsky has noted that there are plenty of in-between proper names
that have descriptive elements, such as "The Pope", "The Holy Roman Empire",
"George IV", "War and Peace", and "∆" used as a name for the empty set.16 There
are some types of names that lack other features common to descriptions but also
lack de jure rigidity. The earlier example of noms de plume and the case of arbitrary
names - if they are indeed names - are like this.
However, many examples of descriptively introduced names are rather
artificial - besides the few real-life examples such as Leverrier’s "Neptune" and
"Jack the Ripper" - and have been thought to be a marginal issue.17 Moreover,
it is not obvious whether these names should really be treated as proper names
and not truncated descriptions.18 Indeed, there still seems to be a quarrel about
the status of descriptive names.19 Maybe the distinction between descriptive, im-
proper and proper names is vague: maybe there are genuinely proper names,
some name expressions that are in fact descriptions, and some terms that are a
mix of both. Maybe non-rigid improper names fall into one of the latter cate-
gories. But the aim of this chapter is not to show that there might be some class of
(quasi) names that are non-rigid, but that no name is intrinsically rigid. From this
point of view, the interesting phenomenon is that even the most proper of proper
names can be used in improper ways, and not only in attitude ascriptions but in
simple sentences as well.
Given names of people are one of philosopher’s favourite examples,
perhaps because such names rarely have improper features (in the sense just
described). Nevertheless, the referential/attributive distinction20 that was sup-
posed to distinguish definite descriptions from names and demonstratives, seems
15Evans 1982.
16Linsky 1977: 69.
17See e.g. Kripke 1981: 79-80; Evans 1982: 48.
18There are some reasons to avoid translating descriptive names as descriptions, e.g., the sit-
uations where the referent of a descriptively introduced name also becomes known by acquain-
tance. But the problem seems to be the same with to the whole idea of descriptive names having
(reference-determining) descriptive content. Récanati (1993: 177–180) argues that because of this,
descriptive names cannot be essentially descriptive: it would be absurd to think that "Neptune"
would somehow radically change its meaning after its discovery.
19See e.g. Jeshion 2004, Reimer 2004, Kanterian 2009.
20See Donnellan 1966.
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to also be present in the uses of all kinds of proper names21 and demonstratives.22
Martinich argues that there are indeed attributive uses of names that exactly fit
Donnellan’s original criteria, such as "Jane Smith" in the following sentence
(15) Jane Smith has won the grand prize.
in the context of the drawing for the grand prize where the chairman of the raffle
committee announces the winner.23 He could as well say "Jane Smith, whoever
she is..." The occurrence of "Jane Smith" is essential in the sense that it could not
be replaced by any other descriptive expression, and thus fits Donnellan’s con-
dition for attributive use. It is essential because the only description that could
possibly take its place is "the winner of the grand prize", but making the substitu-
tion would render a clearly meaningful sentence and an a posteriori fact an a priori
one.
It is not particularly exceptional for names to occur with indeterminate
articles ("I know a Jane Smith") or even as count nouns ("I know four David Ka-
plans"24). Consider, for another example, the following conversation:
(16) (Looking at a guest list) It seems that François Hollande, whoever he is,
is going to come royally late tonight.
(17) Do you mean the François Hollande?
(18) No, for heaven’s sake, it must be another François Hollande.
These cases illustrate the fact that there are different types of legitimate non-
referential uses of proper names that do not fit the common picture of proper
names as something that only contribute their actual designated object to any
proposition, that is, they do not fit the picture of rigidity and direct referentiality
in the strong sense. Again, it can be objected that these are, as well, shorthands
for descriptions. But in some cases, like Martinich’s example, it seems that there
simply is no available description that could be substituted for the name. Given
that almost any name can be used in the ways exemplified above, another expla-
21Martinich 1977, Devitt 1981.
22Bezuidenhout 1997.
23Martinich 1977: 161.
24The latter example is from Bach 2002a.
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nation needs to be given. The explanation I want to suggest is that rigidity is a
part of the semantics of proper names. This would explain why, even if speakers
might have intuitions about the rigidity of names in alethic contexts, there are not
always intuitions about their rigidity in simple sentences.
Of course, all of this could be explained in pragmatic terms. But the
fact that the above examples are reasonable does establish that the "direct intu-
itions" referred to by Kripke are not universally true. The pragmatic account
would then have to explain why, even if the speakers do not have any direct in-
tuitions of rigidity, and even if they used language as if they did not consider
proper names intrinsically rigid, names are nevertheless rigid de jure. Given that
pragmatic approaches already have problems with propositional attitude con-
texts, this attempt does not seem particularly satisfying. Pragmatics might play a
role in unpredictable cases such as propositional attitudes - it seems that proper
names sometimes have de re occurrences and sometimes occur de dicto - where
the speaker intentions play a role in how the sentence should be interpreted. But
the general division between rigidity and non-rigidity is best accounted for by
building it into the semantics of modal operators.
4 Reasoning about Modalities
Kripke’s metalinguistic argument is very compelling. Indeed, after the argument
was introduced it seemed so obvious that names could not have descriptive con-
tent that Kripke was puzzled that Russell, for example, had held the view he
did. It must have been, Kripke thought, because Russell did not consider modal
questions.1 But it seems that Kripke himself has been too quick in drawing the
conclusion that names have the intrinsic semantic property of rigidity. Perhaps
his line of thought was that since the argument does show that names cannot have
classical Fregean senses, it shows that the theory of direct reference has to be right
- and then it is, admittedly, somewhat natural to conclude that names have to be
rigid in themselves.2 But as we saw, the metalinguistic argument does not prove
the latter thesis, and in fact there is evidence against it.
1Kripke 1981: 14.
2Natural but not necessary. The dependencies between rigidity and direct reference will be
discussed towards the end of this thesis.
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What is needed to make sense of the situation, perhaps, is a change of
perspective. If rigidity and non-rigidity are seen as a property of modal contexts,
then the intuitions behind the metalinguistic argument can be respected without
commitment to there being any further intuitions about the semantic status of
proper names in simple sentences. Glüer and Pagin, whose framework is used
a basis for the account to be constructed in this chapter, sum up the situation as
follows:
We agree with Kripke that in ordinary modal thinking we operate
with concepts of de remodality. That is, we are interested in the objects
we refer to, no matter how they are designated. [. . . ] The intuitions
made use of in Kripke’s modal argument testify to this feature of or-
dinary modal reasoning; these are data to be accepted and explained
by any good semantic theory. However, we do not agree that the best
way of explaining them is by means of a thesis concerning (nothing
but) the intension of names. The observed phenomena, we claim, are
essentially due to the de re nature of ordinary modal thinking and are,
therefore, better explained in terms of a semantics for modal expres-
sions.3
Glüer and Pagin’s own works4, while giving a very useful semantic sys-
tem, do not go very deep into the actual mechanics of modal contexts. They admit
that the unpredictability of the behaviour of proper names in certain contexts has
something to do with speaker intentions, but they do not press the issue further.
A philosopher who didmake these intentions the cornerstone of his logic of belief
was Jaakko Hintikka. In order fill in the details in Glüer and Pagin’s program, it
is useful to start with an exposition of Hintikka’s theory of individuation. While
the theory has difficulties when treated as a theory of all modalities, it offers a
good explanation for the somewhat erratic behaviour of names in propositional
attitude contexts. Hintikka’s view, which paid plenty of attention to speaker in-
tentions, can be used to complement Glüer and Pagin’s theory to make it richer
and more explanatory. Furthermore, I will attempt to explain why the theory of
individuation is, in the end, not relevant in alethic contexts. This should be all
3Glüer and Pagin 2006: 508.
4Glüer and Pagin 2006, 2008.
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that is needed for reconstructing Hintikka’s ideas as a part of the pragmatics for
the semantic framework of relational modalities.
4.1 Relational Modalities
The core idea of relational modalities or "switcher semantics" is that rigidity is to
be explained in terms of evaluation in modal contexts.5 Proper names and other
such terms, as Glüer and Pagin put it, "interact with (de re) modal operators in
a peculiar way".6 On a technical level, this means that proper names have two
evaluation functions when - and only when - it comes to modal contexts. The
two modes are called the standard or possible-world evaluation and the actualist
evaluation. The different truth conditions for atomic sentences in the two modes
of evaluation can be expressed in standard relational semantics as follows:7
(P) M,w ✏ P(t1, ..., tn) iff hI(t1,w), ..., I(tn,w)i 2 I(P,w)
(A) M,w ✏ P(t1, ..., tn) iff hI(t1, a), ..., I(tn, a)i 2 I(P,w)
In simple terms, the possible-worlds mode of evaluation picks out the
referent of a name with respect to each possible world. In the actualist evalua-
tion, the referent is picked from the actual world and kept constant with respect to
other possible worlds, although whether it belongs to the intension of the predi-
cate varies from one world to another depending on the intension of the predicate
in that world.8 According to Glüer and Pagin, the possible-worlds mode of eval-
uation is always used for evaluating simple sentences. This is why the authors
call it "standard evaluation". The alternative term "possible-worlds evaluation"
will be used here, but it is important to keep in mind that this mode of evalua-
tion is indeed the more basic of the two. Modal operators function as evaluation
switchers in the sense that they can turn on one or another mode of evaluation.
Glüer and Pagin argue that the alethic operators turn on actualist evaluation and
the usual propositional attitude operators possible-world evaluation. Therefore
5Glüer and Pagin 2006, 2008, 2012.
6Glüer and Pagin 2012: 161.
7See Appendix II for a more detailed presentation of models for relational modalities.
8This, Glüer and Pagin (2008: 312) note, distinguishes their actualist evaluation from simply
applying an actualist operator to the sentence.
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in alethic contexts, as Kripke argued, names do occur referentially. It is only the
mechanism behind this that Kripke and the two authors disagree.
Glüer and Pagin are very neutral with respect to the correct theory of
meaning. The relational modalities framework is obviously well-suited to com-
bining descriptivist features with the direct reference theory. However, the au-
thors do not commit to any particular view about the descriptive content of proper
names.9 They do not explain what determines the possible-world intension of a
proper name. The authors should not be blamed for these reasons, as it is their in-
tention to give a very general framework applicable to different theories of mean-
ing and reference. One could argue that trying to maintain the theory of direct
reference is pointless if proper names are proven not to be rigid and that therefore
the theory of relational modalities requires a descriptivist conception of meaning.
The question of meaning will be considered in the end of the next chapter; so far,
no presuppositions about the correct theory of meaning will be made.
The relational modalities view is obviously not compatible with the idea
of many direct referentialists that proper names are intrinsically rigid. This view
was already challenged in the previous chapter. It also differs from Kaplan-type
direct referentialism in that it defines the ordinary reference of a name as its
possible-world intension. This difference is not apparent when simple sentences
are evaluated in the actual world, but it does show if different possible worlds are
considered. I do not see this issue as particularly interesting from metaphysical
or from technical perspective. It simply underlines the view that Glüer and Pa-
gin hold about semantic properties of proper names: they do not include modal
properties. The semantic profile of proper names themselves only has to do with
this one world and not any possible referents in other worlds. Interestingly, the
account seems to be compatible with Stanley’s10 interpretation of Dummett’s idea
of assertoric content and ingredient sense, which was based exactly on the idea
that different contents are evaluated in simple and in embedded sentences.
The mechanics of modal operators as evaluation shifters is not fully ex-
plained in Glüer and Pagin’s articles. The reason is that while alethic contexts,
9In Glüer and Pagin 2006 the authors do postulate that linguistic meaning could be represented
as a pair of actualist and possible-world intensions. They do not go further into discussing the
nature of this meaning.
10Stanley 1997a, 1997b.
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as can be seen from the metalinguistic arguments, tend to turn on the actualist
evaluation as a rule, propositional attitude contexts and mixed contexts are much
more unruly. When discussing mixed contexts, Glüer and Pagin note that they
tend to be unpredictable in whether co-referring names are intersubstitutable "in
mixed contexts, you sometimes can substitute, while at other times you cannot."11
In a footnote, they further speculate that pure doxastic contexts are unpredictable
like this, and dependent on speaker intentions as well.12 This indeed seems to be
the case. Suppose John happens to know that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Then it
seems perfectly fine to go from
(19) John believes that Hesperus is bright.
to
(20) John believes that Phosphorus is bright.
Glüer and Pagin note that substitutability can be restored bywide-scope interpre-
tation. But as it stands, they give no way to predict the correct interpretation of
scope reading for such contexts, and only suggest that the indeterminacy arises
from the fact that speaker intentions are involved in determining the right inter-
pretation. They consider the issue no further.
A few questions arise here. What are the speaker intentions referred
to? Why exactly do names fail to refer rigidly in propositional attitudes? And is
this kind of framework directly inconsistent with the theory of direct reference?
The objective in the rest of this thesis is to complement Glüer and Pagin’s frame-
work with an account of individuation which connects to both the general level
of evaluation and to the speaker intentions that determine the right interpretation
of propositional attitudes and mixed modal contexts. Furthermore, I will show
how this type of account manages not only to give a solution to the Hintikka-
Kripke problem, but also to the counterexamples to intrinsic rigidity that were
introduced in the previous chapter.
11Glüer and Pagin 2006: 524.
12Glüer and Pagin 2006: 524 (footnote 25).
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4.2 Trans-World Identity and Knowing Who
In order to explain why rigidity fails in propositional attitude contexts, I will
have to go back to Hintikka’s early writings on modalities. Kripke and Hin-
tikka disagreed on whether the problem of "trans-world identity" is relevant to
modal logic. How can we "track" an object that is an inhabitant of several possi-
ble worlds? Kripke thought of this as a pseudo-problem, "putting the cart before
the horse."13 The objects, he argued, are there exactly because we stipulate, on
the basis of the actual world, that they are there.14 In alethic logic, this does make
sense. But Hintikka’s viewpoint, unlike Kripke’s, was always epistemic to a de-
gree. In doxastic or epistemic logic, the picture is not as clear as Kripke suggests.
Suppose I have a belief about Emmy, but I am not certain about who she actually
is: I know that she is one of the few women in my math class, but I do not exactly
know which one. If I want to entertain a belief about Emmy, I cannot stipulate
that some particular person exists in all different belief-worlds of mine, because
there is no one object about which to make a stipulation. This case bears some
resemblance to the examples presented in Chapter 3.
Hintikka’s solution was to make the "knowing who" an essential part of
modal reasoning. This identifying of a person or a thing, often called "individua-
tion" by Hintikka, is a key concept in his theory of modalities.15 One cannot have
a belief about an individual unless he has successfully identified this individual,
i.e., he knows who this individual is. If he cannot identify the individual, he
picks out different things in different possible worlds, in which case the "individ-
ual" referred to is ill-defined (and probably cannot even be called an individual
in the usual sense of the word). Successful individuation, so to speak, allows
to connect the dots representing the manifestations of an individual in different
possible worlds.
Individuation is relevant because individuals, Hintikka maintained, are
not simply given to us. The borderlines of bare physical objects do not necessar-
ily correspond to what we call individuals; and this fact becomes crucial when
dealing with individuals in non-actual states of affairs. We cannot, he notes "ob-
13Kripke 1981: 42-44.
14Ibid.: 44.
15The most important thoughts of Hintikka from 1960’s to 1970’s are covered in Hintikka 1962,
1969, and 1975.
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serve bare particulars, only particulars clothed in their respective properties and
interrelations."16 Kripke’s picture of modal logic is that constant terms directly
pick objects from a pool which is shared by all possible worlds. Moreover, the
underlying assumption is that once an object is named, the name sticks to the
object itself, which, as a member of several possible worlds, carries that intrin-
sic label throughout all the different worlds. But this is, according to Hintikka,
too simplistic. Worlds might come with a certain physical structure, but they do
not come with a predefined stock of individuals. Hintikka’s view could be called
a type of relativity of ontology. Similar thoughts have been expressed by e.g.
Wittgenstein17 and Searle,18 although neither author was as heavily focused on
modalities as Hintikka.
According to Hintikka, the plurality of possible worlds of which an ob-
jects might be a member of blurs the correlation between individuals and objects
in modal logics.19 When quantifying into a modal construction, there is multiref-
erentiality, i.e., the individual that is quantified over actually consists of several
manifestations of the object in different possible worlds. Hintikka argued that
this problem plagues anymodal logic, including alethic logic. His solution was to
make syntactically explicit the condition on which one can quantify into a modal
context.
Briefly put, Hintikka’s basic system does not have constants that are
rigid by default. Only terms whose referents are individuated or identified in
every accessible world, function "rigidly". Let us take doxastic logic as an exam-
ple. The referent of some name n is well-defined for an agent a when
(21) 9xBax = n
holds.20 The expression (23), according to Hintikka, might be said to mean "a has
an opinion about who n is" or "a is certain about who n is". The alethic analogue,
9x⇤x = n, would restore well-defined reference in those contexts. Obviously,
this causes problems with the classical quantifier rules, but so does the varying
16Hintikka 1970a: 410.
17Wittgenstein 1953, e.g. §§27-36.
18Searle 1995: 160.
19Hintikka 1969: 97-98.
20Note that this does not guarantee that there is something that actually is n, or that a has
correctly identified n. It only means that he has individuated something that he believes to be n.
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domain condition in general. Like with the latter, the rules can be augmented,
e.g. 8x⇤nj, 9x⇤nx = c ` ⇤nj[x/c], where n is the number of box operators pre-
ceding the non-modal formula a, can be used as a rule of universal instantiation
for modal formulas.
Obviously, this is not the same idea of rigidity as Kripke’s conception.
Hintikka’s idea of an individuating function, which is supposed to be a repre-
sentation of an individual with respect to a set of worlds can be expressed by
9x(⇤ix = b ^ ... ^⇤kx = b). This function gives a well-defined individual with
respect to a set of worlds and sentences containing an occurrence of b under i, ..., k
modal operators. But Hintikka still cannot capture the notion of rigidity of the di-
rect referentialists. As Sandu21 points out in a short critique of his and Hintikka’s
earlier article "The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference", a definition of rigid-
ity by the presupposition that the name necessarily refers to whatever it refers to
is still context-sensitive in the way that Kripke’s conception of rigidity is not.22
This is perhaps non-problematic in doxastic contexts, since the only kind
of rigidity that is really wanted is precisely the kind of "local rigidity" that (21)
guarantees. Having universal rigidity of proper names is what led to theHintikka-
Kripke problem. I will soon explain why I think that the mechanism of individu-
ation is needed only in the case of propositional attitudes, and leave the problem
unattended for the time being. I will now turn to Hintikka’s definition of the
mechanism of individuation instead.
4.3 Mechanisms of Individuation
In his early works, Hintikka does not give a unitary account of how successful
individuating or cross-identifying in fact happens. The basic idea of his seems
to be that in order to speak of a well-defined individual, one has to identify that
individual in all his accessible possible worlds by cross-comparison. It is in many
ways similar to identifying and re-identifying the same person at different mo-
ments in time. On one hand, Hintikka writes that while it is obvious that people
21Sandu 2006: 549.
22It is perhaps easiest to picture this on a more formal level. Consider some model in a non-
cohesive frame, i.e., a frame with several clusters of worlds that do not have any connections to
the other clusters. Then in this model, names can be made "locally rigid" inside all the clusters
but yet they might refer to different things in different clusters.
47
have the ability to identify something as the same individual at different times
or different counterfactual situations, how people in fact identify individuals is
a matter of psychology, not logic.23 On the other hand, he does give some gen-
eral criteria for individuating, often summarized as "continuity plus similarity".24
Spatiotemporal continuity seems to be given a conceptual priority to individua-
tion. It gives the necessary condition to individuation, much like Kant’s intuitions
of space and time come prior to categories.25
In one of his more specific characterizations of individuation, he argues
that these methods "turn on such facts as bodily continuity, continuity of mem-
ory, certain obvious features of the behavior of material bodies vis-à-vis space
and time (one and the same body cannot be at two places at the same time; it
takes time for it to get from one place to another; it does not change its shape or
size instantaneously, etc.), and many similar physical and psychological regular-
ities."26 He also emphasizes the idea of comparing between worlds, often taking
up an analogue between individuation and comparing the characters in a roman
à clef to real-world people, or comparing fictional characters in different novels.27
Hintikka’s method of individuation raises plenty of questions. First of
all, the idea of cross-world comparison - which is not made any more accessi-
ble by Hintikka’s metaphor of comparing fictional characters in novels - as a re-
quirement for well-defined reference seems overly complex. The nature of the
criteria was also a problematic question, since it seemed to rely on there being
some necessary or essential qualities on the basis of which to identify.28 Describ-
ing the criteria was clearly problematic for Hintikka for the additional reason
that "knowing who" is notoriously context-dependent.29 Furthermore, equating
de re with knowing who could be seen as dubious, since sentences such as "there
is someone who the police do not know to be the murderer of Smith" seems to
make perfect sense.30
Suppose, for the time being, that we accept that "knowing who" does not
23Hintikka 1969: 169-170.
24E.g. Hintikka 1970a: 412.
25Hintikka and Hintikka 1989: 88-90.
26Hintikka 1969: 170.
27E.g. Hintikka 1975: 127.
28Chisholm 1963, 1967.
29See Boër and Lycan 1986 8-11.
30Examples like this are presented in e.g. Carlson 1988.
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require comparingworlds, but rather, picking out the actual individual, as Kripke
suggested. Suppose that we also accept that when the referent is not known, there
is genuine multireferentiality. (One has not been able to single out any referent,
so the indeterminacy creates multireferentiality.) Even if we accept all this (as
I will argue we should), the question remains: what is it to succeed in actually
identifying some individual? Being able to uniquely describe the thing turns out
to be neither necessary nor sufficient. The fact that it is not necessary is shown by
our capability to use names even if we possess a very vague description of their
referents; and there is no reason why we could not be able to use them rigidly as
well. One does not need to have an intimate connection to Gödel in order to refer
to him specifically, or to entertain a de remodal thought about him.31
The fact that a uniquely identifying description is not sufficient can be
illustrated by an example. Suppose that I happen to know that Emmy is the
person who graduated from the same university as I with the highest grades last
year. This is definitely a uniquely identifying description. A friend mentions that
Emmy is organizing a party this weekend and I should definitely come along.
Now, if I have a belief I am going to Emmy’s party on Friday, can my belief
be characterized as one in which the name refers rigidly? Not necessarily. For
suppose that I do not know who the woman is who graduated with the highest
grades. I can think of three people that might be, as far as I know, Emmy. Again,
when I talk of Emmy, I do not have an intention to refer specifically to any of
them.
This is perhaps whyHintikka argued that there can be different methods
of individuation: it might be that I, in a sense, do know who Emmy is - she is the
person who got the highest grades - but I have not personally identified her with
any woman on my math course. A fair amount of articles and books has been
written about different modes of individuation, particularly the special method
of perceptual individuation.32 Hintikka originally distinguished between the two
methods of perceptual and public individuation.33 Stretching concepts a bit, the
first could be called individuation by acquaintance and the second individuation
by description.34
31Kripke 1981: 91-92.
32E.g. Howell 1972, Bacon 1979, Niiniluoto 1982.
33Hintikka 1970b.
34Hintikka uses these definitions in "On the Logic of Perception" (in Hintikka 1969), but he
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As defined in earlier section, individuation, in general, means that one
successfully locates something in his (context-dependent) cognitive framework.
The criteria of bodily continuity, continuity inmemory, etc., whichwere described
earlier, were what Hintikka identifiedwith physical or public methods of individ-
uation.35 Consider, however, a case in which someone perceives a man, but does
not know who he is, i.e., has not publicly individuated him. In the accessible
possible worlds of the perceiver, there are different people that could be identi-
fied with the man he sees. However, there is an object that can be traced through
the different possible worlds for the perceiver in virtue of its occupying the same
place in his field of vision. In a sense, these different individuals that could oc-
cupy the same place are the same man - that is, the man who is standing in front
of him.36 This kind of direct individuation is called perceptual. The individual
is located with respect to some framework, but unlike with public individuation,
this framework is dependent on the perceiver’s visual situation. In the logic of
perception, these two kinds of individuation can be represented by using two dif-
ferent kinds of quantifiers; the usual quantifiers 9x and 8x for public methods of
individuation and
9
x and
8
x for perceptual methods.37
The existence of a perceptual method of individuation suggests that not
only is the information needed for "knowing who" context-dependent, but that
different kinds of information give different ways in which one can know who
someone is. Many puzzles of belief arise because the believer identifies someone
or something twice. Pierre knows Londres from the stories he has heard in his
childhood; but when he moves to the city he does not realize that he has already
identified it once, and thus identifies "London" for the second time, failing to
see the identity of the two cities. Moreover, perhaps only acknowledging two
ways of identifying, public and perceptual, is too rigid. Not all of us have the
capability of visually perceiving objects. Is tactual individuation different from
visual individuation? Clearly we can individuate the same thing tactually and
visually, or auditively and visually; these double-identification cases happen very
himself says that they are not completely satisfactory.
35Hintikka 1969: 170.
36Hintikka 1970b: 874.
37I am diverging from Hintikka, who uses the two pairs of quantifiers the other way round, i.e.
9
x,
8
x standing for public individuation and 9x, 8x for perceptual individuation. This is for the
sake of continuity with the rest of the thesis.
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often in real life.
I am not suggesting that our formal presentation of doxastic logic should
be clogged with several different types of quantifiers to match the way different
individuals can be identified. I am only trying to illustrate the difficulty of com-
ing up with a neat criteria that would determine when one knows enough to
individuate. It is enough to notice that when people are uncertain of the referent
of the name they are using, and if they cannot rely on the existence of a linguis-
tic background, substitution with an actually co-referential name is not possible,
and so the name has to be in a narrow scope. Where exactly to draw the line
between successful individuation and "not being quite certain enough" is an in-
teresting question, but answering the question in detail is not needed to justify
the principle.
In the following sections, I will try to make sense of individuation as a
method of fixing the reference. My aim is to show that Kripke is right in that, in
alethic contexts, it is enough to stipulate that the actual individual we are talk-
ing about exists in accessible possible worlds. This makes actualist evaluation
in Glüer and Pagin’s schema possible. However, possible-worlds evaluation is
genuinely multireferential, i.e., different individuals are picked out as referents
of a name in different worlds of evaluation. Here, the "speaker intentions" that
allow us to pick the right interpretation in a propositional attitude or mixed sen-
tence, are intentions to individuate. In these contexts, the wide-scope interpretation
("knowing who") resembles actualist evaluation in that what is identified is the
actual individual. Once one has, so to speak, located the actual world, he can
in fact stipulate the existence of the referent of a proper name in other worlds.
The crucial aspect in which my view differs from Hintikka’s is that I do not be-
lieve that successful individuation is trans-world identification. It is actual-world
identification. However, when the speaker is uncertain, the name ceases to refer
anything in particular and is evaluated in other possible worlds instead (narrow
scope or "not knowing who"). In particular, I want to (i) clarify why individua-
tion is not an issue in alethic contexts, (ii) how speakers can refer to individuals
and (iii) when they cannot. The first question is the topic of section 4.4 and the
latter two are discussed in section 4.5.
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4.4 Why Speakers Do Not Need to Individuate
Identification, at some level, is necessary for reference. In fixing the reference
of the name, the thing named must be a thing that can be somehow identified.
Whether the act of naming is an "initial baptism" of Kripke’s (criteria of identifi-
cation are given indexically) or a descriptive definition (criteria are given descrip-
tively) is not relevant. In a world where there is no telling two things apart, or
where things do not tend to stay together very long, giving names makes very lit-
tle sense. I take it to be obvious enough that in order to give a name, there has to
be a presupposition that the thing that is named can be somehow individuated.
That is, reference-fixing presupposes individuation. Even if the criteria of indi-
viduation connect directly to the individual and not the name, the link between
the name and the criteria is this initial presupposition.
Even more obviously, this does not entail that the meaning of a name
is its identifying description, or that this description is necessary for determin-
ing the reference. Furthermore, it is not necessary for successful reference that
an individual speakers possesses such criteria of identification, as most of the
names we use are defined quite vaguely for ourselves and yet refer perfectly
fine.38 It seems that identifiability is necessary for naming but identification is
rarely needed for proper use of names. It is needed precisely when what is meant
by a sentence becomes dependent on speaker intentions.
Identification, even if necessary for fixing the reference, is not relevant
in ordinary speech. This is because our language use, and especially our use of
proper names, relies on the "division of linguistic labour". This idea was origi-
nally made famous by Putnam.39 Putnam described his "sociolinguistic hypoth-
esis" as follows, using as an example a natural kind term "gold":
[Speakers] engender a division of linguistic labor: every one to
whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word ’gold’;
but he does not have to acquire the method of recognizing whether
something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speak-
ers. The features that are generally thought to be present in connection
with a general name - necessary and sufficient conditions for mem-
38As Kripke shows in his Gödel example: see Kripke 1981: 82-85.
39Putnam 1973.
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bership in the extension, ways of recognizing whether something is in
the extension, etc. - are all present in the linguistic community consid-
ered as a collective body; but that collective body divides the "labor"
of knowing and employing these various parts of the "meaning" of
’gold’.40
Putnam’s main point is to show that meanings are not in the heads of individual
speakers. An individual speaker rarely possesses anything that could fix the ref-
erence of a term such as a proper name or a natural kind that he uses. It is rather,
says Putnam, "the sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body to which
the speaker belongs that fixes the extension."41
The division of linguistic labour thesis is nowadays accepted by most
philosophers, descriptivists and direct referentialists alike. AsDummett has noted,
Putnam does not actually argue that names could not have any kind of descrip-
tive content, but only that, if such content exists, it is not necessarily a part of
the individual speaker’s knowledge but rather a part of the knowledge of the lin-
guistic community.42 What is clear is that a speaker can rely on the background of
commonly agreed meaning or referent of the word, whatever that correct mean-
ing or referent is based upon, even if he himself does not fully grasp it.
The fact that this kind of division of labour exists supports Kripke’s idea
that a speaker’s having a way of individuating, or being able to uniquely iden-
tify43, the referent is not necessary for rigid reference in alethic contexts. More-
over, the idea that the thing spoken about can be stipulated to exist in other possi-
ble worlds as well, is very plausible at this general level of language in a commu-
nity. What is relevant is that the actual referent is, in a collective sense, known.
40Putnam 1973: 705.
41Putnam 1973: 706.
42Dummett 1978. Putnam does argue, in the same article, that what fixes the reference is an
indexical definition - although as Searle (Searle 1983: 285) has argued, even this is not necessarily
anti-descriptivist - but this second thesis is based on other grounds than the linguistic labour
argument.
43Hintikka (1969: 104) actually uses this phrase. It is, in any case, fair to note that his idea of
possible worlds of comparison in the process of individuation was that they are "small worlds"
or world-pieces which describe the speaker’s view of the world rather than entire universes (see
Hintikka 1998). However, Hintikka did not carry this idea into the actual semantics of modal
logic, where he still usually views possible worlds as something like complete world-descriptions.
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The fact that there is something identical to the thing in other possible worlds is
not another discovery that needs to be made at the time of fixing the reference of
a name.
Alethicmodalities are in this sense largely similar to ordinary non-modal
discourse. How the speaker thinks of a name is not relevant to truths of meta-
physics, and thus the speaker’s certainty or uncertainty of reference is not rele-
vant either as long as he can rely on the background of the conventions in the
linguistic community that he is a part of. The reference is guaranteed by this
background. Since, as the metalinguistic argument undeniably shows, the com-
mon mode of speaking about modalities is de re, this reference is guaranteed to
be rigid as well.
The explanation for why individuation is not relevant in alethic contexts
is rather straightforward. The slightly bigger challenge comes in explaining why,
despite the division of linguistic labour, individuation is still sometimes neces-
sary for proper (rigid) reference. As the examples in the Chapter 3 suggested, it
seems that reference can sometimes be left indeterminate by using the name "at-
tributively". Likewise, it seems that speaker’s uncertainty of the referent of the
name can lead to situations where the name is used non-rigidly. In the next sec-
tion, I will try to make a case for the necessity of individuation - at the level of an
individual speaker - in certain contexts where the guarantee of proper reference
by the linguistic community is canceled.
4.5 When Speakers Do Need to Individuate
To summarize, the picture of modal contexts that I have attempted to paint is
this. Modal operators function as evaluation-shifters. Alethic modal operators,
and possibly similar operators such as temporal ones, turn on the actualist eval-
uation. This case was rather simple and easy. Propositional attitude operators in
e.g. doxastic and epistemic logics turn on the possible-worlds evaluation, where
names are non-rigid. In these contexts and in mixed contexts involving alethic
and propositional attitude operators, substitution of proper names with actually
co-referential names sometimes seems to be possible and sometimes not. Glüer
and Pagin suggested how to handle mixed contexts by altering the scope of quan-
tifiers and modal operators, and referred in passing that the same idea can be
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used for beliefs. Take the three formulas:
(22) 9x(x = n ^ BaF(x))
(23) 9xBa(x = n ^ F(x))
(24) Ba9x(x = n ^ F(x))
All of these might be said to codify a sentence of the type "a believes that n is
F" in natural language. But due to the role of the doxastic operator as an evalu-
ation shifter, all of the above get a slightly different interpretation. Suppose the
sentences are evaluated in the actual world. (24) is probably the simplest: it is
true iff, for any B-alternative v of a, there is some d 2 D(v) such that d = I(n, v)
and d 2 I(F, v). Here, the name clearly cannot be substituted with an actually
co-referring name. On the other hand, (22) allows for such substitution. Since the
sentence is evaluated in the actual world, it is true iff there is some d 2 D(a) such
that d = I(n, a) and for any B-alternative v of a, d 2 I(F, v). When evaluated
with respect to the actual world, the wide-scope construction in (22) mimics the
actualist evaluation used with alethic operators.
(23) is a case in between. 9xBa(x = n ^ F(x)) is true iff there is some
d 2 D(a) such that for all belief-alternatives v of the actual world, d = I(n, v)
and d 2 I(F, v). Note that 9xx = n does not follow from this statement. A name
n0 can be substituted for n if and only if 9x9yBa(x = n ^ y = n0 ^ x = y). This
is because nothing in the relational modalities system prevents the object being
referred to by different names in other possible worlds - the fact that this does not
necessarily happen is the whole point of relational modalities. Therefore, in (23)
we might say that the name is rigid for the believer, resulting in a kind of localized
rigidity that is familiar from Hintikka’s modal logic.
Glüer and Pagin argued that the correct choice of quantifier scope in a
sentence such as "a believes that n is F" seems to depend on the intentions of the
speaker. The natural language sentence itself is, in a sense, semantically underde-
termined. Hintikka interpreted all modalities in this manner, and he argued that
the intentional state in question is knowing who someone is, or being capable of
individuating that person. But Hintikka’s account, which was supposed to be
applicable for all modalities, seemed too complex because it demanded this step
of individuation even in agent-independent alethic contexts. He also argued that
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correct individuation is the result of cross-world comparison by what seemed
to boil down (as the roman à clef analogue suggested) descriptions, which many
philosophers considered problematic.
So far, I have suggested that in alethic logic, Kripke’s view is correct.
Individual speakers do not need to "know who", because rigid reference is guar-
anteed by the conventions of the linguistic community. Individuation is a pre-
requisite for reference, but it does not determine the referent. Furthermore, the
act of individuation that is relevant is recognizing the individual in the actual
world; there are no other worlds around to be looked at through a telescope.
However, this cannot be the whole picture. In propositional attitude contexts, the
presupposition of individuation (by convention) is clearly sometimes canceled,
and what the individual speaker knows or does not know becomes relevant again.
The speaker’s ignorance, as Hintikka noticed, can cause a situation where the
name cannot be interpreted to refer rigidly. What in fact happens, as was sug-
gested in Chapter 3, is that a speaker intends to refer in a way where it does not
matter, or it is not known who the referent is. This cognitive state of the speaker
becomes relevant when propositional attitudes are considered. There is now, in
addition to the language itself and the linguistic community, a point of view of
the one who believes, hopes, knows, and so on. In this sense, it could be said that
there is a descriptive element of a sort, if not in names, at least more generally in
epistemic and doxastic constructions.
The difference between an ordinary context of conversation and talk
about beliefs is that while the first can rely on a commonly shared linguistic
background, the second localizes to the believer and his perspective. One can
outsource meanings, but one cannot outsource beliefs. Burge44, who went fur-
ther than Putnam and attempted to take beliefs out of people’s heads as well,
might have disagreed. But he does not seem to make much difference between
literal meaning and speaker meaning; furthermore, he does not consider individ-
ual speakers’ beliefs about language use.45 Maybe one could say that what one’s
44Burge 1979.
45In Burge’s arthritis case, for example, it seems to be quite relevant that the individual who
(in the real world) believes that he has arthritis in his thigh thinks that arthritis can refer to a type
of muscle pains. In the situation where the community indeed uses the word in a way that is
consistent with this individual speaker’s use, the truth value of the belief, with respect to the
conventional meanings of language, obviously changes, but it would be rather misleading to say
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beliefs mean, in one sense, are not up to him. But certainly one cannot rely on the
linguistic community in what he believes. It is a different question to refer to the
theory of general relativity in conversation, trusting that someone knows what it
actually means, than to say that one knows how the theory of general relativity
works just because there is someonewho certainly knows.46
Of course, one could decide that how the believer uses language does
not matter: if he has a belief about Hesperus, he has a belief about Phosphorus,
whether he knew that the planets are identical or not. This "objective" use of de re
- "relational belief", as Quine called it47 - might not be in itself a wrong interpre-
tation, but it would result in the same consequences as the "Heroic Pragmatists"
approach to belief statements, i.e., contradicting beliefs. Furthermore, this does
not seem to be consistent with the common view of interpreting belief sentences
in natural language. The relational belief interpretation seems to be an excep-
tional use and has to be made clear in the context of conversation. ("He believes
that Superman is a weak loser." "Oh, does he?" "Well, he believes that of Clark
Kent, but he doesn’t really know that Clark Kent is Superman.")
Whether the speaker knows who or what he is talking about affects the
correct interpretation of proper names in reports of his beliefs. When someone
has to get to know whom he is talking about, he wants to locate this person or
this object in the actual world; or, to put it in other terms, locate the actual world
with respect to this name’s referent.48 What exactly is needed to locate the per-
son varies depending on the precision demanded of the context. This relativity
is typical to any kind of knowledge; in this sense, almost any philosopher would
agree that knowledge is relative to a context.49 "Knowing who" might be a par-
that he now has a completely new belief.
46Admittedly, the distinction between (conventional) meaning of a belief and the belief as the
speaker himself understands it is not obvious. However, an extensive examination of the concept
of belief is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is focused on the semantics of belief sentences.
What is clear, I think, is that many philosophers who have used arguments similar to Burge’s
have not paid much attention to this distinction either, perhaps because anything that might be
going on in the believer’s head would be overlooked as internalist and irrelevant by the hardcore
externalists.
47Quine 1976b.
48The second definition would be more in line with e.g. Stalnaker’s (see Stalnaker 2001) two-
dimensionalism, which shares some similarities to Glüer and Pagin’s account.
49And it would not make him a contextualist; epistemic contextualism is a rather special kind of
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ticularly context-dependent notion, but this does not mean it could not serve as a
necessary condition for wide-scope interpretation of belief.50
Let us summarize what has been established so far as well as what has
not been established. To begin with the negative, what type of knowledge is
involved in identifying a person or a thing is, I think, not a question for the
philosopher. I believe that Hintikka’s referring to neuropsychology and empiri-
cal sciences was a better move than his remarks about comparing fictional novels.
Of course, plenty has been written about "knowing who".51 For the purposes of
this thesis, I think it is enough to acknowledge that the cognitive state of the be-
liever does affect the interpretation of the belief, and that "knowing who" might
happen in several different ways (methods of individuation), as was shown in
the previous sections. Furthermore, it was argued that the sort of "identification"
that would apply to alethic, agent-independent contexts, is only relevant in fixing
the reference. Due to the division of linguistic labour, it need not be relevant for
determining the reference in alethic contexts, and perhaps need not be relevant
for the semantics of proper names apart from those initial acts of reference-fixing.
I have already stated that I do not believe that individuation is trans-
world identification, but identification in the actual world. Thismight be amerely
semantic point, since Hintikka, despite often using the term "comparison", prob-
ably did not believe in the existence and objectivity of other possible worlds any
more than Kripke did. Unlike Kripke, however, Hintikka was also concerned
with the cases where one cannot identify the referent of a name in the actual
world, and thus cannot stipulate the existence of any one thing in other possi-
ble worlds. In these situations, the name refers to different things in different
possible worlds. This is the one case where there is genuine multireferentiality,
which happens, not because one did not succeed in cross-world comparison, but
because he did not succeed in actual-world identification.
One final note about "successful" individuation. As was noted, 9xBax =
n does not entail 9xx = n. Therefore successful identification can be misidentifi-
viewwhere the belief attributor’s (not the believer’s) psychological and/or conventional situation
gives the conditions for knowledge (Rysiew 2011).
50In the case of belief, "having an opinion about who someone is" might be a more accurate
notion. The difference is that is needed for "having an opinion" is not necessarily correct identifi-
cation, but determinate (unique) identification of an individual.
51One of the most comprehensive accounts is probably Boër and Lycan 1986.
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cation, which is different from an identification failure which causesmultireferen-
tiality. When 9xBax = n is true and 9xx = n is false, the set of accessible worlds
for the agent happens to be a set of worlds where the name n refers to a differ-
ent thing than in the actual world, but nevertheless to the same thing in all the
accessible worlds. Since the doxastic operator turns on standard, possible-world
evaluation, this is a perfectly possible situation. Thus we have three options for
identification: correct and successful individuation, incorrect but successful in-
dividuation (misidentification), and unsuccessful individuation (no individual is
uniquely identified).
5 Solving the Puzzles of Reference
In Chapter 2, the Hintikka-Kripke problem of apparent disparity between alethic
and doxastic contexts was introduced. In Chapter 3, similar issues of the reference
of proper names in simple sentences were examined in order to show that there
are simple sentences that do not seem to have intrinsically rigid proper names. In
Chapter 4, I attempted to construct a thesis about belief contexts, using Glüer and
Pagin’s relational modalities as a basic semantics and adding Hintikka’s mecha-
nisms of individuation to complement the semantic underdetermination of belief
sentences. In what follows, this thesis is applied to the Hintikka-Kripke problem
and mixed (alethic/doxastic) modalities. Furthermore, I will return to the case of
improper uses of proper names in simple sentences. It has been claimed by some
philosophers that these cases show that names are non-rigid in alethic and doxas-
tic contexts alike. While it has been argued here that rigidity is not a property of
proper names, the relational modalities framework nevertheless has names rigid
in alethic contexts. The whole framework was built in order to maintain that
Kripkean intuition while denying the problematic intrinsic rigidity requirement.
I will briefly consider some arguments that have concluded the non-rigidity of
names in alethic contexts from the evidence of improper uses of names in simple
sentences. I will also show how to interpret the phenomena from the relational
modalities point of view.
The theory that has been sketched so far is not a descriptivist theory. In
fact, it has been a conscious decision to stay as neutral about meaning of proper
names as possible. However, due to the non-rigidity and operators as evaluation-
switchers in the relational modalities framework, some of the objections to de-
scriptivism taken up in Chapter 1 can be, with somemodifications, turned against
the relational modalities view as well. Therefore I will re-examine Soames’ sec-
ond argument against descriptivism as well as Everett’s argument against Stan-
ley’s theory and show that the approach that was constructed in Chapter 4 need
not fall for these traps.
It might be argued that it is not correct that this view is not descriptivist;
even if nothing has explicitly been said about meaning, the view is simply not
compatible with the theory of direct reference. The dominant view seems to be
that direct reference cannot be consistently combined with non-rigidity. Hintikka
himself was adamantly against the new theory of reference, and even though
he did not ever explicitly talk about his theory of meaning, he assumed that his
theory is inconsistent with Kripke’s.1 I believe that these judgments have been
too hasty. I argue, admittedly controversially, that the theory considered here,
despite having non-rigid names, is compatible with some forms of direct reference
theories, including Kripke’s own view.
5.1 The Hintikka-Kripke Problem and Mixed Modalities
The original puzzle, given in the beginning of this thesis, was to make sense of
the two sentences
(25) If Hesperus is Phosphorus, then it is necessary that Hesperus is Phospho-
rus.
(26) If Hesperus is Phosphorus, then John believes that Hesperus is Phospho-
rus.
The suggested formal interpretations of (25) and (26), respectively, were
(27) Hesperus = Phosphorus! ⇤Hesperus = Phosphorus
(28) Hesperus = Phosphorus! BjHesperus = Phosphorus
1In a reply to Chisholm’s criticism, he sympathizes with Searle (Hintikka 1967: 44). It could be
rather fairly said that Hintikka’s theory was descriptivist to a degree, although he never explicitly
referred to "senses" or "intensions" (as descriptive meanings).
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The intuition is that while (27) is valid, (28) is not. In the relational modalities
framework, (27) is true (in the actual world) but neither of the sentences is valid.
Unlike the unarticulated constituents view, the relational modalities approach
does not, therefore, deny that (27) and (28) are correct formalizations of (25) and
(26). Unlike the pragmatist view, and even some descriptivist accounts, it denies
that proper names have the semantic property of rigidity, whether it follows from
direct referentiality or rigid senses. Rigidity is simply a matter of modal contexts,
no more and no less. Since the different modal operators function as evaluation
shifters, the modal consequents (27) and (28) get evaluated in a way that corre-
sponds to our intuitions.
Consider, first, the belief sentence. Suppose that the evaluation of the
sentence happens in the actual world a. Then the antecedent of (28), evaluated
in the standard (i.e., possible-world) mode of evaluation, is true if and only if
I(Hesperus, a) = I(Phosphorus, a). (The fact that this does look like actualist
evaluation simply results from our possible world in consideration being the ac-
tual world.) (28) contains a doxastic operator in the consequent of the implication
which turns on (or in this case, maintains) the possible-worlds mode of evalua-
tion. The doxastic statement, therefore, is true if and only if, for all w such that
aRw, I(Hesperus,w) = I(Phosphorus,w). Clearly, if names are not inherently
rigid, this can be false while the antecedent is true, so the implication is invalid.
The antecedent of (27), being a simple sentence, is evaluated as before.
The identity statement in the consequent of (27), since it is in the scope of an
alethic operator, is evaluated in the actualist mode: it is true if and only if, for all
w such that aRw, I(Hesperus, a) = I(Phosphorus, a). If the truth of the sentence is
considered in the actual world, (27) is indeed true since both its antecedent and
consequent are true. The statement is still not universally valid. Consider the
actually false statement Hesperus = Sirius. Take some possible world w where
the sentence is true. In this possible world, the implication Hesperus = Sirius !
⇤Hesperus = Sirius is false, since the consequent is evaluated in the actualist
mode of evaluation and I(Hesperus, a) 6= I(Sirius, a). Even the weaker schema
⇤b = c ! b = c is not, as was mentioned, valid (substitute Hesperus and Phos-
phorus for the variables and consider the sentence from the point of view of a
world where Hesperus is not identical with Phosphorus).
How about the mixed contexts that were problematic for all types of
61
accounts? Let us first reconsider doxastic contexts once more. We noticed that
altering the scope of the proper name in a doxastic construction allows for more
sophisticated interpretation which depends on whether the speaker refers inde-
terminately, or whether he is uncertain of the referent. There is a difference, in
the relational modalities framework, between the two sentences
(29) Bj9x9y(x = Hesperus ^ y = Phosphorus ^ x = y)
(30) 9x9yBj(x = Hesperus ^ y = Phosphorus ^ x = y)
Obviously, (29) is evaluated similarly to the consequent of (28). (30), on the other
hand, picks the referents of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" from the actual world
and keeps them constant when evaluating the accessible worlds for the agent. It
is the type of "local rigidity" that is triggered by successful individuation. If the
agent knows (has an opinion on) what Hesperus and Phosphorus are, i.e., he has
individuated the planets (or the planet), substitution is possible.
Mixed contexts are unpredictable in the same way as doxastic contexts.
Our original problem sentence "John believes that Hesperus might not be Phos-
phorus" can be interpreted with the names taking different scope:2
(31) 9x9yBj(x = Hesperus ^ y = Phosphorus ^⌃x 6= y)
(32) Bj9x9y(x = Hesperus ^ y = Phosphorus ^⌃x 6= y)
(33) Bj⌃9x9y(x = Hesperus ^ y = Phosphorus ^ x 6= y)
With respect to the belief, (31) would be the case where the referent is individu-
ated, and (32) would represent an individuation failure. But a construction such
as (33) rigidifies the name again, since the alethic operator switches the mode
of evaluation. If John holds the fallacious modal belief that possibly, Hesperus
is not Phosphorus, the only correct interpretation can be (32). (31) and (33) are
necessarily false, so John cannot hold such beliefs.
Curiously, if John misidentifies, a reading of the type (31) cannot be the
correct one, for it would require that two actually identical objects are not actually
identical, which is a contradiction. The presence of the alethic operator blocks
2I am interpreting both names taking the same scope. Obviously, allowing them to vary in
scope, different combinations creates two more different options.
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John from misidentifying. Why misidentification with respect to beliefs about
modalities is impossible is probably more of a question a technical nature than
metaphysical. Nevertheless, the third option between correct individuation and
an individuation failure is not available in mixed cases.3
5.2 Improper Names and Intuitions of Non-Rigidity
If definite descriptions are added as terms, they would be evaluated in possible-
worlds evaluation regardless of the situation, unless, of course, they happened to
contain an indexical or modal component ("the actual F", "this F here"). Naturally,
they can also be rigidified (with respect to the possible world of evaluation) in
the same way as proper names in belief sentences, that is, altering the quantifier
scope. Descriptive names, as well as Katz’ improper names, seem to function
exactly like other proper names, which suggests that they indeed are different
from definite descriptions at least in modal behaviour. Arbitrary names are a
curious group, since they are most definitely not rigid. If I say, "let n be an odd
number greater than 11", it is clear that n, since not even clearly defined in the
actual world, cannot be rigid in other possible worlds. Perhaps this is part of the
reason why arbitrary names are not very often considered "real" names but rather
hidden quantifier expressions or a special class of names referring to "arbitrary
objects".4
The intuitions against the intrinsic rigidity of proper names, as consid-
3I wish to thank Professor Sandu for suggesting me that the "might", when occurring in the
scope of the belief operator, could be in fact an epistemic "might". This option is never considered
by Glüer and Pagin, but in fact, it could be made consistent in their framework. It feels natural to
allow for the epistemic possibility of Hesperus not being Phosphorus; and it makes sense that the
alethic operator would get an epistemic coloring in the scope of a doxastic operator. Interpret-
ing the situation in this way, misidentification would again be possible in mixed modal contexts.
Translated into switcher semantics, this would mean that the alethic operator in the scope of a
modal operator inherits the properties of the doxastic operator, turning off its normal actualist
mode of evaluation. The exact formulation of the function of these occurrences of alethic opera-
tors needs a lengthier explanation which will not be considered here. Nevertheless, tweaking the
interpretation of ordinary mixed modal sentences in this way might be an interesting addition to
Glüer and Pagin’s theory of relational modalities.
4See Breckenridge and Magidor 2012 for a brief introduction to different types of approaches
to arbitrary names.
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ered in Chapter 3, are perhaps a more interesting case. I suggest that the intu-
itions arise from the fact that proper names in simple sentences are evaluated in
the possible-worlds mode of evaluation, and thus are not inherently rigid. This
is barely a negative thesis: it says that names do not have, by default, a modal
component to their semantics. It does not say anything about their evaluation in
alethic contexts, and thus nothing about their rigidity in alethic contexts. It is true,
however, that there is some sort of epistemic intuition that in cases of "whoever",
it does not matter who the referent is, i.e. the referent is somehow indeterminate.
As Hintikka has noted, the cases of not knowing who are very similar to "who-
ever" used in the attributive use of names and descriptions.5 But does this mean
that the names would be evaluated non-rigidly in alethic contexts? An affirmative
answer would mean that the relational modalities framework cannot be correct
about the evaluation of alethic sentences. And if it were not correct, then the
theory would essentially boil down to wide-scopism, which has a fair amount of
problems of its own.
Glüer and Pagin never consider this possibility. But the correct answer
to the question, I believe, is no. Consider the sentence
(34) Aristotle (whoever he is) might not have been Aristotle.
Despite the seeming falsity of the sentence, it has been claimed by some philoso-
phers, on the basis of similar examples to those in Chapter 3, that proper names
do not need to be rigid in alethic contexts either. They have suggested that there
is, indeed, an interpretation under which a sentence such as "Aristotle might not
have been Aristotle" is true. Sosa, for example, suggests that one could mean-
ingfully say something such as "You know, if it had not been for Plato, Aristotle
would have never become Aristotle", where the second occurrence of Aristotle is
in narrow scope and non-rigid.6 Kent Bach also argues that there is a non-rigid
(narrow scope) reading of "Aristotle". It is what he calls a "predicative reading"
of "is".7 He further explains his view:
If we consider Aristotle and the bearer of ‘Aristotle’ and whether
the former might not have been identical with the latter, then given
5Hintikka 1967: 47-48.
6Sosa 2001: 23.
7Bach 2002a: 84.
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who Aristotle is and who the bearer of ‘Aristotle’ is, ["Aristotle might
have not been Aristotle"] is false, since the former and the latter are
identical and identity is necessary. But if we consider Aristotle and the
property of bearing the name ‘Aristotle’ and whether Aristotle might
not have had that property, obviously [the sentence] is true. In this
case, it is read predicatively.8
However, whether there is such a predicative reading depends on there
being a predicate synonymous with the name Aristotle, which needs not be nec-
essarily the case. In fact, that is exactly what the direct referentialists deny. Bach
himself is a proponent of what he calls the "nominal description theory". He ar-
gues that "Aristotle" does have a nominal, non-substantive sense "the bearer of
’Aristotle’". If "the bearer of ’Aristotle’" could be freely substituted for "Aristotle",
i.e., if it was synonymous with the name, then clearly making this substitution to
(34) would result in a true statement. But not everyone would agree that "Aristo-
tle" and "the bearer of ’Aristotle’" are synonymous, or that (34) has a reading on
which it is true. The examples of "attributive" or "predicative" use in alethic con-
texts seem to be very unusual, apart from alethic sentences occurring in mixed
contexts. The fact that the attributive use is nonstandard can be seen from the
stress put on "Aristotle", as expressed by italics, in Sosa’s example. But even
if one can say "Aristotle might have not been Aristotle" and mean that Aristotle
might have not been the bearer of the name "Aristotle", does it follow that the
namemust have that meaning?
I believe that the intuition of indeterminacy in certain simple sentences
does not come from the fact that the names would, if occurring inside alethic
contexts, be evaluated in possible-world evaluation. Instead, I argue that it comes
from another metalinguistic intuition, namely that in the simple sentence
(35) x is Aristotle
x gets different values in the domain when the sentence is uttered in different
possible worlds. But this just represents the intuition that names are evaluated in
the standard, non-rigid, mode of evaluation in simple sentences. The fact that it
is a very abnormal use of "might" that would make the sentence "Aristotle might
8Bach 2002a: 84-85.
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have not been Aristotle" true supports the idea. Therefore, the type of "modality"
Bach is considering in his true interpretation of (34) is in fact metalinguistic, not
metaphysical (alethic). In fact, it could possibly amount to Aristotle not neces-
sarily being the bearer of "Aristotle", since the bearer of "Aristotle" is different in
different possible worlds. In alethic contexts, however, we are not interested on
the possible bearers of the name, but the possible properties of the person who
actually is (this is the "is" of identity) Aristotle. This is what Kripke repeatedly
insisted on in Naming and Necessity, and seems to be well in line with our general
use of language, as the unfamiliarity of Bach’s and Sosa’s examples showed.
5.3 Some Possible Objections to Relational Modalities
I want to briefly consider two objections against descriptivism that were already
mentioned in the first chapter. The relational modalities account is not a descrip-
tivist theory, but stays neutral on the issue of meaning. Nevertheless, due to non-
rigidity of proper names, some of the objections against descriptivism can be, at
least if slightly modified, also presented against the relational modalities view.
The first is Soames’ criticism against rigidified description theory and the second
is Everett’s recent criticism of Stanley’s distinction between assertoric content and
ingredient sense.9
Soames argued that the idea that senses of names are rigidified descrip-
tions is problematic from the point of view that inhabitants of other possible
worlds might also have modal beliefs without having any thoughts about the
actual world. Since the evaluation of modal sentences in the relational modalities
approach is tied to the actual world, a similar objection could be made against
the theory. Soames’ argument seems undoubtedly problematic if one takes a
Lewisian view of possible worlds. According to this type of view, the fact that
our world is "actual" does not make it special in any way. Rather, "actual" simply
has an indexical function to refer to the world in which a statement is made.10 But
Stalnaker type "ersatzism" about possible world needs not accept that there are
any real, concrete inhabitants of other possible worlds. Stalnaker does not deny
that the possibilia exist, at least in some sense of theword. But the possible worlds
9See Soames 1998, Everett 2005.
10Lewis 1986: 92-96.
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are, he argues, ontologically dependent on the actual world.11 The ersatzist view,
as well as the anti-realist views, justify the picture in which the actual world is
special. But one could say that this is merely semantic play: even if possible
worlds are not real, Soames’ argument is valid. Let us just hypothetically consider
a counterfactual possibility in which things have different attributes than in the
actual world. Are the (rigidified) senses of the names then different? And if they
are, are they even senses?
The rigidified descriptivist theory might have problems with these ques-
tions, but the relational modality theory does not. It does not claim that there
are senses of proper names, nor does it claim that those senses are rigid descrip-
tions. In fact, it could not even consistently make the latter claim. The relational
modality models simply happen to be always centered in the actual world.12 It
is perfectly possible to devise another model where some counterfactual world
is appointed as "actual" in which case the proper names in modal statements ex-
pressed in the "actual" world are evaluated with respect to that world. If the point
of view is changed to that of inhabitants of some other world, whether they exist
or not, then the "center" of the model has to be changed to that possible world.
That is, there has to be a change in models. This is perfectly in line with the er-
satzist view of possible worlds (and there is no reason why it should conflict with
the Lewisian view either), and it is not vulnerable to Soames’ criticism.
Everett’s criticism of Jason Stanley’s argument is similar to Soames’ crit-
icism of wide-scopism. Stanley, as one can recall from Chapter 1, argued that sen-
tences have both an assertoric content and ingredient content. Assertoric content
is what is meant when the sentence is asserted; one could say that the meaning
of a simple sentence is its assertoric content. When the sentence is embedded in a
modal construction, it then contributes to the sentence its ingredient content, not
its assertoric content. Everett first asks what should be made out of sentences of
the type13
(36) The sun is shining. That is actually true but possibly false.
In cases like this, Stanley has argued that the demonstrative "that" refers to the in-
11Stalnaker 1984: Chapter 3.
12See Appendix II.
13Everett 2005: 130.
67
gredient sense.14 This was his way out of the Soames’ challenge to wide-scopism.
But then Everett gives a more challenging puzzle, his actual example being
(37) Arithmetic is undecidable. It is denied byHilbertians but necessarily true.
It seems that "it" refers to one and the same thing that is both necessarily true but
nevertheless denied by Hilbertians. According to Stanley, the object of a proposi-
tional attitude such as denial should be the assertoric content, not the ingredient
content. But if the pronoun "it" would refer to different things in the two different
sentences, the sentence should have an odd feel to it (as in all cases of syllepsis,
e.g. in Searle’s often mentioned example "They cut the cake, the grass, and the
taxes.")
The relational modalities account is similar to Stanley’s view in that it
says that proper names contribute different things to simple and to alethic sen-
tences. As was noticed, sentences of the type
(38) Hesperus is Phosphorus. That is necessary.
are usually understood as statements of necessity, where the whole sentence is in
the scope of the modal operator. Then the sentence should be formalized simply
as⇤Hesperus = Phosphorus (the fact that "that is necessary" follows the sentence
should not be an issue here). But (38) could also be interpreted as a metalinguistic
statement saying that the simple sentence always has the same truth value in dif-
ferent possible worlds. That, according to the relational modalities view, is false,
since simple sentences are always evaluated with respect to the possible world of
evaluation and names have different referents in different possible worlds.
Here is the example, first encountered in the Section 1.4, which is analo-
gous to (37).
(39) Hesperus is not Phosphorus. John believes it but it is necessarily false.
It seems that the exact same sentence is both impossible and believed by John.
But ⇤Hesperus 6= Phosphorus and BjHesperus 6= Phosphorus are evaluated dif-
ferently with respect to the proper names. If (39) is treated as a metalinguistic
statement concerning the truth values of a simple sentence in different types of
14Stanley 1997a: 577.
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possible worlds, there is no problem of different references. Then the sentence
should simply be false whether we consider alethically or doxastically possible
worlds (and in fact, the relational modalities theory can hold that these are ex-
actly the same worlds). The difficulty is that there seems to be no way of in-
terpreting the necessity in (39) in the ordinary (that is, not metalinguistic) way
without agreeing that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" refer to different things in
the alethic and the doxastic statements, and thus strictly speaking, the sentence
that is impossible is not the same as the sentence that is believed by John.
Given that (39) clearly has an ordinary reading in which both necessity
and belief is predicated of (what seems to be) the same sentence, the only op-
tion for the relational modalities view seems to be to accept that "Hesperus" and
"Phosphorus" have different referents in the two statements.15 Nevertheless, I do
not think this is yet a casualty to the view. Obviously, (39) does not have all the
usual features of syllepsis. But it is not perfectly clear either whether it implies
that John is truly thinking of the same objects that the names in the sentence actu-
ally refer to. It is impossible that Hesperus would not be Phosphorus, so how can
John believe that? Because he does not know the actual referents of the names -
he is mistaken about which world is actual. So it could be said that he does not
really have a belief the content of which is the same as the sentence that is referred
to in the alethic statement. If he knew which objects Hesperus and Phosphorus
are, he would not hold such a belief.
I do admit that this explanation is still not perfectly unproblematic. Even
with the explanation, the first impression of (39) is not that the names have differ-
ent references when necessity is predicated and when belief is predicated of the
sentence. Perhaps there is no such clear intuition about the different referents be-
cause the sentence could be read as predicating a "relational" belief, put formally
as
15Here, the option of interpreting "might" as an epistemic might that was briefly suggested in
the section onmixedmodalities could be invoked, but it toomight not be a completely satisfactory
solution in this case. One could say that the fact that the usual qualities of syllepsis are missing
in the example because we naturally interpret the "might" as representing an epistemic property.
But then the sentence "Hesperus is not Phosphorus" would not be necessarily (in an epistemic
sense) false; and we clearly do not have any intuition about that. Quite the contrary, it seems that
it is true, which suggests that we do interpret the "necessarily" as codifying alethic necessity.
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(40) 9x9y(x = Hesperus ^ y = Phosphorus ^ ¬⌃x 6= y ^ Bjx 6= y)
in which case the referents of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" stay constant. This
sentence would be impossible - John cannot have such a belief, in which case this
simply cannot be the interpretation that correctly describes the situation. There is
no way in which John can believe that the object that is Hesperus and Phospho-
rus is not identical with itself. But note that Everett does not have an explanation
for how the belief or another propositional attitude can have a metaphysically
impossible sentence as its content either. So if he, or anyone else, can present an
alternative reading which can explain why John believes the same sentence (syn-
tactically and semantically) that is impossible, then the relational modalities view
is indeed threatened. Since the Heroic Pragmatism was shown to be a unsatisfac-
tory and unrealistic solution, I doubt there can be one. The reason why the sen-
tence does not initially seem odd (unlike the statement about cutting grass and
taxes) is still, admittedly, left unexplained.
5.4 A FewWords about Meaning
So far, not much has been said about meaning. My objective has been to defend
an account of modalities that is consistent with the intuitions in Kripke’s metalin-
guistic argument but also with the intuition that names do have some non-rigid
occurrences and thus are not intrinsically rigid. Furthermore, I have tried to bring
more light into the non-rigidity of proper names in doxastic contexts and show
whyHintikka was correct about propositional attitudes, even if his account could
not be as plausibly extended to alethic modalities. But does this mean that the de-
scriptivist picture is right?
I argued that the existence of criteria of individuation at the level of the
linguistic community is necessary for modal reasoning - or, for that matter, for
any reasoning about proper names whatsoever. If we cannot tell one thing apart
from the others, we cannot meaningfully name it, i.e., fix the reference of the
name. Although we can, in ordinary speech, delegate the identification of the
reference to the linguistic community, this is not always guaranteed. Individu-
ating or failing to individuate, for an individual speaker, determines whether he
can have a de re belief about the thing identified. But clearly, the criteria of iden-
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tification cannot serve as a sense of a name. In Hintikka’s account, the criteria
are directly linked with the individual but not with the proper name. What links
them to the name is the necessity of being able to somehow single out the thing
that is being named in order to make sense of naming. But this still goes into the
reference-fixing category, and thus does not function as a meaning in the classical
Fregean sense. The basic idea of there being a criteria of identification associated
with the referent of a proper name is not against the Kripkean view. Kripke said
that such criteria might well exist, but that in that case, it would not be relevant
to determining the meaning of a name. It might play a similar role to the initial
baptism in the far end of Kripke’s "causal chain" connecting the uses of a proper
name to its referent (where the referent is the only "meaning" passed on in the
chain of communication).
Hintikka himself was clearly against the theory of direct reference. In
most of his work, however, he only argues against the idea that names are rigid
designators. Kripke used the metalinguistic argument to show that names are
rigid, and seemed to think that since he had refuted Fregean-Russellian descrip-
tivism, the theory of direct reference must be correct. But can non-rigidity, then,
be viewed as a refutation of the theory of direct reference? Furthermore, if it can-
not, could Hintikka’s view (or at least the account presented here) be compatible
with direct reference after all?
The answer depends on what kind of connection there is between rigid-
ity and direct reference. Clearly, not all terms that are rigid refer directly. But
there seems to be a consensus that a term that refers directly has to be a rigid des-
ignator as well. E.g. Kaplan has argued to the effect that the link between rigidity
and direct reference is conceptual: the question of what it takes to refer directly
necessarily links to its reference in counterfactual situations.16 Indeed, Kaplan’s
thought experiments in "Demonstratives" that are meant to support his version of
direct referentialism all rely on comparing actual and counterfactual situations.
Some philosophers have suggested that it might be metaphysically possible that
names are directly referential but yet somehow change their referents fromworld
to world.17 But this type of view would be, to say the least, controversial, and
16Kaplan 1989.
17E.g. Salmon (1981: Chapter 3) mentions this idea.
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often dismissed altogether as an idea.18
The claim that Hintikka’s idea of individuation does not rule out the
direct reference theory as a theory of meaning is bold; and it seems that to say
that non-rigid directly referential terms exist is evenmore blasphemous. On these
grounds, one could conclude that the only theory of meaning compatible with the
account given in this thesis is descriptivist to some degree. Clearly, the criteria of
individuation will not do as a mediating sense, but there must be something else
that can serve as a sense of the name. But I am doubtful whether this must be
the case, given that descriptivist theories have so many problems on their own.
Therefore I want to briefly consider the controversial question about non-rigid
directly referential names.
Genoveva Martí suggests that whether there can be directly referential
and non-rigid terms depends on what is meant by direct reference. She argues
that there are two different conceptions in the literature that have both been
grouped under "theories of direct reference".19 She calls these two conceptions
the Millian direct reference and the propositional direct reference. This distinc-
tion seems to be influenced by Crimmins’ idea of direct reference versus direct
contribution.20 The former, she argues, is independent of rigidity, while the lat-
ter view - exemplified by Kaplan’s account in "Demonstratives" - is conceptually
dependent of the notion of rigidity.
The difference between the two views is that they emphasize different
features of the "directness" in direct reference. For the Millian, it is crucial that
there is no semantic mediators between a name and its reference. On this ap-
proach, "the distinguishing mark of direct reference is the absence of a semantic
mediator, the absence of a mechanism (be it a rule, a procedure, a mental rep-
resentation or a qualitative profile) whose role is to adjudicate, to determine the
referent on a given occasion of use."21 This is the original thesis of Mill, as well
as Saul Kripke and (possibly) Ruth Marcus. The main thesis of the propositional
direct referentialist is that a directly referential term only contributes its referent
18E.g. LaPorte’s (2006) article on rigid designators in the Stanford Encyclopedia acknowledges
this idea but notes that it would be controversial even as a thesis of possible languages, not to
mention actual spoken languages.
19Martí 2003: 168.
20Crimmins 1992: 11-15.
21Martí 2003: 168.
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(an object) to the proposition in which it occurs.22 This is how Russellian logically
proper names might be thought to function.23 What is problematic is that these
characterizations are often used as if they meant the same. As we saw earlier, it
was not clear whetherMarcus, in addition to arguing for her tag theory, wanted to
maintain the thesis of direct contribution. But regardless of the confusion around
the idea of "direct reference", the distinction seems reasonable.
On the propositional view, being directly referential means that once the
referent is fixed, the object it contributes to the proposition is not changed by
any alterations in the circumstances of evaluation.24 It is quite obvious that then,
direct reference cannot be separated from rigidity. It is amore interesting question
whether theMillian idea of direct reference can hold if names are non-rigid. Martí
argues that this is indeed possible: aMillian could think that names are non-rigid.
She describes the case as follows:
[...] this Millian thinks that the object relevant for the evaluation of
what is said by an utterance of "Hesperus is bright" varies from world
to world. But, unlike the descriptivist, this Millian does not think that
the reason for the variation is the presence of a semantic mechanism
associated with "Hesperus." The reason, for this Millian, has nothing
to do with the semantics of "Hesperus" but with the metaphysics of
which objects are connected with which other objects in different pos-
sible worlds.25
For someone who held, for example, a Lewisian conception of possible worlds,
this would not be too far-fetched a position. And perhaps not too odd, either. One
can of course start wondering how the referent can vary from world to world if
there is nothing but the object determining the referent. But the case for empty
names is very similar, and direct referentialism has not been abandoned because
22Martí 2003: 163.
23Russell (1917: 219) states that "[every] proposition which we can understand must be com-
posed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted". Since according to Russell’s view, it
is essentially sense-data that we are acquaintedwith, then propositions are composed of sense-data,
i.e., the referents of his logically proper names. This would make Russell’s account of logically
proper names a propositional one. Of course, this is a rather special case, since Russell’s class of
logically proper names was extremely limited.
24See e.g. Kaplan 1989: 512-513.
25Martí 2003: 169.
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of empty names. How does one refer directly to something that does not exist?
Direct reference to possibilia, in my opinion, is not much more miraculous than
non-rigid direct reference, even if the latter is considered far more controversial.
Kripke himself never explicitly endorsed the thesis of direct contribu-
tion. His view of direct reference, coupled with the causal theory of reference,
is more subtle. One could say that he took a Millian approach in the way it is
described by Martí, along with the idea that the reference is guaranteed by the
initial act of naming, after which the referent is "passed along" from one speaker
to another in a chain of communication.26 This idea in itself does not commit
Kripke to rigidity: he could have said that causal relations being different in dif-
ferent possible worlds, the same name might end up referring to another person.
Of course, Kripke did not accept this, for he thought it would be a merely linguis-
tic thesis about someone having been named differently. He was right in the sense
that this is not what people do when they engage in alethic modal reasoning. But
he failed to see that the possibility of different referential relations between names
and individuals is, in fact, relevant to other kinds of modalities.
The conclusion is that while Hintikka would not have accepted Kripke’s
theory of meaning, nothing in his theory of individuation is strictly inconsistent
with the idea. Likewise, although Kripke’s causal theory of reference and his
version of direct reference are compatible with non-rigidity, he probably would
not agree with the theory of relational modalities. Both descriptivist theories of
meaning and the Millian variants of direct referentialism can, at least theoreti-
cally, be adapted to the basic framework sketched in this thesis. However, I will
not take any further stand on the issue.
Conclusion
Ascribing rigidity to modal contexts rather than to the semantics of proper names
in themselves can accommodate for non-rigid uses of proper names, as well as
respect the intuitions behind attributive uses of proper names. The relational
modalities view is also consistent with the conclusion of Kripke’s metalinguistic
argument, i.e., that the correct mode of (alethic) modal reasoning is de re. More-
over, it allows for a more flexible approach towards doxastic and mixed contexts.
26Kripke 1981: 96.
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Accompanied with a theory of individuation, it can bring some lawfulness to
the seemingly unpredictable behaviour of names in propositional attitudes and
mixed modalities while maintaining this flexibility.
The proposed account would limit the applicability of individuation
only to contexts where the individual speaker’s intentions are relevant to inter-
pretation. Individuation is, as Hintikka argued, a prerequisite for modal reason-
ing - and any sort of reasoning with proper names - but its relevance is usually
limited to fixing the reference. Once a thing has been named, it can be assumed to
be individuated and stipulated to "exist" in other possible worlds. This possibil-
ity relies on the fact that one speaker alone does not have to do all the linguistic
work, but that there is division of labour. An individual speaker can rely on the
background of the linguistic community and its conventions, and thus individu-
ation is only ever relevant in acts of naming.
However, what a speaker knows or does not know about the world or
about language becomes crucial when reports of mental, intentional states are
considered. In these cases, it would be wrong to attribute the knowledge of
the collective linguistic background to an individual. What matters for the ref-
erence of proper names, now, is whether the speaker has enough (descriptive,
visual, etc.) knowledge to, with respect to the situation, identify the actual indi-
vidual he is talking about. Individuation is now his personal responsibility, so
to speak. While the amount of information is highly context-sensitive, it is clear
that when one fails in identifying something, there will be multireferentiality, and
thus normal substitution between co-referring names is no longer possible. It is
only when the speaker has correctly identified the referent of the two co-referring
proper names that substitution is possible. Even then, only "localized" rigidity is
attained: the name behaves as if it were rigid for the agent.
The choice of a theory of meaning was left open. Unlike the theory
of rigid designators, the relational modalities view is compatible with descrip-
tivism. I also argued that it is compatible with certain "Millian" types of direct
reference, including Kripke’s own theory. The relational modalities framework
is perhaps more inviting to descriptivists, who have trouble adapting their ap-
proach to standard semantics with intrinsically rigid proper names. But also di-
rect referentialists could benefit, considering the problems of maintaining both
direct reference and direct contribution without any descriptive elements such as
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roles or guises. In Chapter 2, this kind of approach was shown to be unintuitive
as a theory of propositional attitude statements and, moreover, prone to semantic
paradoxes.
The direct referentialist should not be uncomfortable with the weakened
Hintikkan theory of individuation in doxastic contexts, either. (The descriptivist,
especially if taking an epistemically motivated stance like Dummett and Searle,
would naturally be quite comfortable with it.) There is nothing particularly con-
troversial about the fact that one needs to individuate in order to give a name,
whether the correct mode of individuation is indexical or descriptive or whether
both are accepted. The idea that one cannot always rely on division of linguistic
labour, and that something else needs to be taken into account in doxastic cases,
should not be too queer either. After all, the unarticulated constituents type of
views - which often try to conserve direct reference and rigidity - begin from the
same presupposition. But compared to the formalization of these types of views,
as exemplified by Holliday and Perry’s account, the relational modalities seman-
tics has the advantage of not containing valid but seemingly meaningless state-
ments.
It is quite easy to add definite descriptions and other naturally non-rigid
terms to the logic of relational modalities.1 It is another question, and an inter-
esting one, whether other types of rigid terms can be treated in this manner. In a
recent article, Glüer and Pagin argue that the same framework works for natural
kind terms as well.2 Considering that, as they note, the suggestions for the se-
mantics of natural kind terms are less satisfactory, and that the field has been less
thoroughly examined than the semantics of proper names, this is an interesting
application. It has been rather convincingly shown3 that demonstratives exhibit
similar behaviour to proper names and descriptions in having both "attributive"
and "referential" interpretations. Indexicals and modalities, especially proposi-
tional attitudes, are a notoriously messy terrain. Whether relational modalities
would have an application there is not clear, but might be worth further research.
1Glüer and Pagin 2006, 2008.
2Glüer and Pagin 2012.
3Bezuidenhout 1997.
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Appendix I: Classical Modal Logics
Modal logic adds the two modal operators, ⇤ (read "it is necessary that") and
⌃ ("it is possible that"), to standard propositional or first-order logic. The basic
semantics are first given here for classical propositional modal logic and then ex-
tended to first-order logic. Intuitively, for something to be necessary is for it to
be the case in every possible situation. Defined in a similar manner, possibility
is being the case in at least some possible situation. Possible situations are repre-
sented bywhat are called possible worlds, which can be for our purposes thought
of as maximally consistent sets of sentences. That is to say, for any possible world
and for any sentence, either the sentence or its negation (but not both) is true the
world. Another feature of modal logic is that it is often not desirable that every
possible situation be a possible alternative for a given situation. Thus conditions
governing the relations between possible worlds have to be added to the systems
of modal logic as well.
This gives us the following semantics. Given a language L, a relational
or Kripke model (not to be confused with the relational modality models dis-
cussed in Appendix II)M = hW,R,Vi for propositional modal logic consists of
a set of possible worlds W, an accessibility relation R, and an evaluation V. The
members of W are possible worlds. The accessibility relation R is meant to cap-
ture the idea that not every logically possible situation is a relevant alternative to
some state of affairs. The pair hW,Ri is called a frame. Different systems of modal
logic are differentiated bywhich conditions govern R. Theweakest normalmodal
logic known as K gives no specifications for the accessibility relation. Different
extensions of K add restrictions such as reflexivity, transitivity, Euclideaness, etc.
V is a function which assigns to every proposition some V(p) ✓W, representing
the set of possible worlds in which p is true.
Satisfaction in a model (and a world) in quantified modal logic is de-
fined similarly to classical propositional logic, the only addition being the truth
conditions for modal operators ⇤ and ⌃. The conditions can be defined as fol-
lows:
✏M,w p iff w 2 V(p)
✏M,w ¬j iff 2M,w j
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✏M,w j ^ y iff ✏M,w j and ✏M,w y
✏M,w ⇤j iff for all w0 2W : wRw0, ✏M,w0 j
Other connectives can be defined, as usually, in terms of ¬ and ^. ⌃ can
be defined in terms of⇤ and ¬: ⇤j $ ¬⌃¬j. This shows that⇤ and ⌃ resemble
the two quantifiers 8 and 9 in their behaviour, the difference being that ⇤ and ⌃
can be seen to quantify over worlds, not individuals.
The most common deductive systems for modal logic are still axiomatic
(as opposed to e.g. natural deduction systems and sequent calculi). This is also
the approach assumed in this thesis in the few cases where syntactic matters are
referred to.1 In the case of K, what is added to the standard axioms and deriva-
tion rules of propositional logic is the axiom K: ⇤(j ! y) ! (⇤j ! ⇤y) and
the rule of necessitation ` j ) ` ⇤j (i.e., if j is a theorem, then so is ⇤j). Differ-
ent axioms can be added to a modal system that have the effect of constraining
the accessibility relation. If it is required that the accessibility relation is reflexive,
i.e., every world is accessible to itself, the proper axiom is T: ⇤j ! j. Other
well-known axioms are 4: ⇤j ! ⇤⇤j (corresponds to the condition of transitiv-
ity), 5: ⌃j ! ⇤⌃j (Euclideaness) and B: j ! ⇤⌃j (symmetry). When talking
about alethic and doxastic modalities in this thesis, no assumptions about the
accessibility relation will be made unless explicitly stated.2
In the case of first-order modal logic, standard relational models are of
the formM = hW,R,D, Ii. There are two alternative views to how the domain
should be related to the possible worlds. The first view is that the domain should
stay constant from world to world; the second is that domains can vary between
worlds. In varying domain models, we add a function which assigns each possi-
ble world w its own domain Dw ✓ D. In constant domain models, Dw = D for all
w 2 W. The proponents of constant domain models are often called possibilists,
1This is not to say that other systems could not be adapted to suit the needs of modal logic,
although this too has been suggested (see e.g. preface to Blackburn, de Rijke and Venema 2001).
Recently, labelled systems for natural deduction and sequent systems have been developed that
can handle the context-dependency of the rule of necessitation (see Viganò 2000, Chapters 3-4
for labelled natural deduction and Negri and von Plato 2011, Chapters 11-12 for labelled sequent
calculus for modal logics).
2For a detailed examination of standard systems of modal logic, see e.g. Fitting and Mendel-
sohn 1998: Chapter 1.
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since their one domain of quantification usually has to contain "possible objects"
(unless possibilia are banished from the language altogether), and the varying
domain theorists actualists, although the terms might not perfectly correspond to
the two views about domains.
In the varying domain option, the existential quantifier corresponds,
with respect to a possible world, to existence in that world, which might make
it a more "intuitive" interpretation.3 However, the same effect can be simulated
by defining an existence predicate E! that contains, with respect to each possible
world, the set of things that actually exist in that world. Varying domain quantifi-
cation, on the other hand, cannot express everything that constant domain quan-
tification can express. When quantifiers have their actualist readings, it cannot be
stated in the language that all possible objects possess some property.4 If one is
not too concerned about the metaphysics of modal logic, constant domain mod-
els can often be a simpler choice. Here, varying domain models are nevertheless
used for the sake of flexibility, with the exception of the exposition of Holliday
and Perry’s intensional logic, where the authors’ choice of using constant domain
models is followed.
The interpretation function I assigns some I(c,w) to every constant term
c such that I(c,w) 2 Dw, and to any n-place relation symbol Pn an n-place relation
I(Pn,w) on Dw. The assignment µ attaches some µ(x) 2 D to each variable x. The
interpretation of a term in a world under an assignment, Iµ(t,w), is I(t,w) in case
t is a constant, and µ(t) in case t is a variable. An assignment µ0 is called an x-
variant of an assignment µ if and only if µ and µ0 differ at most in their value
assignment to x.
The conditions of satisfaction for atomic formulas Pn(t1, ..., tn) and quan-
tified formulas are defined as follows:
✏M,w,µ Pn(t1, ..., tn) iff hIµ(t1,w), ...Iµ(tn,w)i 2 I(Pn,w)
✏M,w,µ 8xj iff for all x-variants µ0 of µ such that µ0(x) 2 D(w), ✏M,w,µ0 j
Connectives behave similarly to propositional modal logic, and the exis-
3But this is not necessarily so: Williamson 1998 gives some quite convincing arguments
for why actualism, when thoroughly analysed, is in fact no more intuitive than possibilism.
Williamson 2013 extends this discussion on a metaphysical level.
4Cresswell 1991: 276-277.
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tential quantifier can be defined in terms of the universal quantifier and negation,
as usually.
Alethic logic, the logic of metaphysical modalities, is only one type of
a system that can be represented in this framework. Deontic logic, for example,
uses "it is obligatory that" and "it is permissible that" as modal operators. The
same semantics can be easily adapted to the purposes of epistemic and doxas-
tic logics as well. In the logic of knowledge, Ka takes the place of the necessity
operator (read "a knows that") and in doxastic logic, Ba ("a believes that") serves
the same purpose. In doxastic logic, for example, if some world is accessible to
an agent, that world represents a situation that the agent cannot rule out, given
all that he believes. Accessible worlds represent situations that, for all the agent
knows, might be actual. Thus for someone to believe that something is the case,
he has to see it as being the case in all possible worlds accessible to him. This
makes plenty of sense: for if one could think of a relevant counterfactual situa-
tion in which something might not be the case, he would probably not believe it
until he has been able to rule out that particular counterfactual situation.
The accessibility relationmust be of course weaker in epistemic and dox-
astic logics than in alethic logic. Not all possible circumstances are actual options
for the agent in the given context. For doxastic logic, we might, e.g., assume
that what someone believes, he believes that he believes (positive introspection);
therefore we might choose to include the axiom 4, Baj ! BaBaj. Beliefs are
could assumed to be consistent, that is, it could be assumed that D ⇤j ! ⌃j is
an axiom as well. These rules require some degree of rationality from the agent,
and it has been debated whether Kripke semantics give a too idealized picture
of doxastic logic. However, we will accept these idealizations and not examine
alternative semantics in this thesis.
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Appendix II: Models for Relational Modalities
Glüer and Pagin use pointedmodel structures of the formM = hW,R, a,Dw,D, Ii
whereW is a set of worlds and R is the accessibility relation, as usual, and a is the
"privileged" actual world. D is the domain of individuals, and Dw is a function
fromW to P(D), giving each possible world its own domain. Lastly, I is an inter-
pretation function, which gives all non-logical constants c and all worlds w 2 W
some I(c,w) 2 Dw, and all n-place relation symbols Pn an n-place relation on Dw.
It is required that for any non-modal formula j to be defined in w, the
constants and variables must have an interpretation in the domain of w, i.e., for
every constant c, I(c,w) 2 D(w) and for every variable x, µ(x) 2 D(w). In
the case of actualist evaluation, we require that I(c, a) 2 D(w). Otherwise, the
formula is undefined. For a formula ⇤j it is required that j is well defined in
all accessible worlds.5 The definedness of other complex formulas can be given
recursively.
Let us first define validity under actualist evaluation.6 Interpretation of
terms in a model with respect to a world is as follows: Iµ(t,w) = I(t,w) in case t
is a constant, and Iµ(t,w) = µ(t) in case t is a variable.
✏aM,w,µ Pn(t1, ..., tn) iff hIµ(t1, a), ...Iµ(tn, a)i 2 I(Pn,w)
✏aM,w,µ t = u iff Iµ(t) = Iµ(u)
✏aM,w,µ ¬j iff j is defined in w and 2aM,w,µ j
✏aM,w,µ j ^ y iff ✏aM,w,µ j and ✏aM,w,µ y
✏aM,w,µ 8xj iff for all x-variants µ0 of µ such that µ0(x) 2 D(w), ✏aM,w,µ0 j
✏aM,w,µ ⇤j iff for all w0 2W : wRw0, ✏aM,w0,µ j
We can now define validity in alethic relational models. The definition
is rather familiar except for the clause for necessitated formulas.
5Glüer and Pagin 2008: 314-315.
6I will use the term "relational models" for Glüer and Pagin’s models for relational modalities,
following the authors’ own use of the term. The term "classical models" is used for standard
models in relational or possible worlds semantics. Hopefully, this use of words is not overly
confusing.
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✏M,w,µ Pn(t1, ..., tn) iff hIµ(t1,w), ...Iµ(tn,w)i 2 I(Pn,w)
✏M,w,µ t = u iff Iµ(t) = Iµ(u)
✏M,w,µ ¬j iff j is defined in w and 2M,w,µ j
✏M,w,µ j ^ y iff ✏M,w,µ j and ✏M,w,µ y
✏M,w,µ 8xj iff for all x-variants µ0 of µ such that µ0(x) 2 D(w), ✏M,w,µ0 j
✏M,w,µ ⇤j iff for all w0 2W : wRw0, ✏aM,w0,µ j
Unlike in classical models, obviously, there is no rigidity requirement for the class
of constant terms, and therefore necessary identity statements between proper
names are not always true. But this is not the only difference between relational
and classical models. Even though non-rigid classical models do not validate
c = b ! ⇤c = b, they do validate the weaker ⇤c = b ! c = b which fails to be
valid in relational models.7
It is clear that the classical models and the relational models have the
same evaluation with respect to the actual world. There is a difference when sim-
ple sentences in other possible worlds are considered. In "RelationalModalities"8,
Glüer and Pagin dedicate a long section to comparing the definition of logical
consequence (and validity) in classical and relational models. In what follows, I
summarize their most central points.
The notions of (universal) classical consequence and actualist relational
consequence turn out to match each other, if certain restrictions are added. Ac-
tualist consequence is here defined to be logical consequence under the actualist
evaluation. The required restrictions concern both quantification and modal op-
erators. First of all, since it is demanded in relational models that every term
in a model has a denotation in the actual world, then if 8xP(x) is true in the
actual world, then so is P(t). But this is not a classical consequence unless the
restriction to non-empty domains is added. Similarly, the inference from ⇤P(t)
to ¬(P(t) ^ ¬P(t)) is a relational consequence (since t is, again, required to have
7A countermodel would be one in which, for some c and b, I(b, a) = I(c, a) but for some w 2
W, I(b, a) 6= I(c, a). Then in this model,⇤c = bwould be satisfied inw - as its satisfaction is linked
to the actual world by actualist evaluation of alethic operators - but c = b would nevertheless not
hold.
8Glüer and Pagin 2008.
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denotation in the actual world) but is a classical consequence only in reflexive
frames.
With these restrictions, the actualist consequence in relational modali-
ties and the universal consequence in classical semantics can be shown to coin-
cide.9 Furthermore, the equivalence still holds if, e.g., transitivity is added to the
frame conditions.10 If the domains are assumed to be constant, then obviously the
equivalence holds also in K, since then by definition, every term has a denotation
in the actual world.
Although Glüer and Pagin do not consider multimodal logics, combin-
ing alethic and doxastic modalities in one system is quite straightforward. Let
us denote the doxastic accessibility relation (for the agent) by Rd. The actualist
evaluation for doxastic formulas, then, is:
✏aM,w,µ Bdj iff for all w0 2W : wRdw0, ✏M,w0,µ j
and the general definition of validity in relational modality models is
✏M,w,µ Bdj iff for all w0 2W : wRdw0, ✏M,w0,µ j
which is simply to say that doxastic statements are always evaluated in the stan-
dard possible-worlds evaluation. No special class of doxastically possible worlds
needs to be added, since all alethically possible worlds are also doxastically possi-
ble and vice versa. What distinguishes alethic and doxastic modalities is only the
modes of evaluation. Models would then have the formM = hW,R,Rd, a,Dw,D, Ii
where the only addition to the pure alethic models defined above is the second
accessibility relation used in evaluating doxastic statements.
In this type of a bimodal logic, we can see that consecutive alethic and
doxastic operators in a mixed modal sentence switch the actualist evaluation on
and off, as should be expected. To give a simple example, the sentence ⇤BaF(b)
is satisfied in a world w in a bimodal modelM under an assignment µ
iff for all w0 2W : wRw0, ✏aM,w0,µ BaF(b)
iff for all w0 2W : wRw0, for all w00 2W : w0Rdw00, ✏M,w00,µ F(b)
9Glüer and Pagin 2008: 318-321.
10Ibid.: 321. At least symmetry and (consequently) Euclideaness can be shown, similarly to
transitivity, to belong to the conditions under which actualist and classical consequence are equiv-
alent. The proof can be found in Glüer and Pagin 2008 and will not be not detailed here.
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iff for all w0 2W : wRw0, for all w00 2W : w0Rdw00, I(b,w00) 2 I(F,w00)
i.e., the sentence is true if for all doxastically possible worlds w00 that can be
reached from any alethically accessible world w0 for w, whatever is designated
by b in w” is F (in w00). The interpretation of mixed sentences in section 5.1, ex-
pressed in slightly more informal terms, proceeds by the same principles.
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